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ABSTRACT 
Managers of companies for which takeover bids have been or are 
likely to be made--"targets"--engage in a variety of tactics designed 
to minimize the likelihood of a takeover or increase the price an 
acquirer must ultimately pay. The welfare effects of these tactics are 
in dispute. This paper considers one such tactic, the running of 
"auctions" by managers of a target after an initial bid has been made; 
an auction is held if, as is often the case, the target's managers can 
interest other companies in bidding. This paper argues that auctions 
reduce welfare because they dampen search for suboptimally run firms, 
and do not have a comparative advantage over unregulated markets in 
moving corporate assets to their highest valued uses. Further, the 
shareholders of targets do not have property rights to the gains from 
takeovers that auctions could be viewed as protecting, Hence, the law 
that now permits auctions to occur should be changed. 
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Impe r f e c t  I n forma t i on a n d  T h e  T e n d e r  O f f e r  A u c t ion 
* 
A l a n  Schw a r t z  
S h a r e hol d e r s  w a n t  cor por a t e  ma n a g e r s  to ma x i m i z e  sh a r e  
v a l u e s  bu t t h e  man a g e r s  h a v e  d i s cr e t ion whe t h e r  t o  m a x i m i z e  or 
not ov e r  a r a n g e  of bus i n e s s  ou tcom e s . T h i s  d i s cr e t ion e x i s t s  
beca u s e  t h e  cos t s  t o  s h a r e h ol d e r s  o f  obs e r v i n g ma n a g e r  be h a v i or 
of t e n  e x c e e d  t h e  g a i n s , a n d  beca u s e  con t r ac t s  con d i t i on i n g
mana g e r  r e w a r d s  on l y  o n  cor por a t e  ou t come s cannot e n s u r e  
ma x i m i z i n g  be h a v i or . 1 M a r k e t s for corpor a t e  con t ro l  a n d  for 
man a g e r i a l  s e r v ice s m a y  cr e a t e  i nc e n t i v e s  for ma n a g e r s  t o  
ma x i m i z e . M a n a g e r s  who do not cou l d  be d i sp l a c e d  by t a k eov e r s ,
w h i ch a r e  ma d e  pos s i b l e  b e ca u s e  s h a r e s  o f  compan i e s  r u n  
s ubopt i ma l l y  s e l l  be low " t r u e "  v a l u e s . A l so ,  man a g e r s  w h o s e  
corpor a t i o n s  perform bad l y  may s u ffe r  r epu t a t lon a l  l os s e s . T h e  
l a t t e r  s a nct i on ope r a t e s  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o r  gov e r nme n t  con d uc t  b u t  
t h e  forme r d e pe n d s  i mpor t a n t l y  on t h e  r u l e s .  For e x ampl e , a 
compan y  for wh ich a b i d  h a s  be e n  m a d e  -- t he " t a r g e t "  -- pos s i bl y  
cou l d  d e f e a t  a t a k e ov e r  i f  t h e · l a w  per m i t s  i t  t o  me r g e  w i t h  a 
compe t i t or of t h e  b i d d e r  -- t he 11a cq u i r e r 11-- for t h e n  t h e  t a r g e � 
cou l d  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  t a k eo v e r  �ou l d  v i o l a t e  t h e  a n t i t r u s t  l aw s .  
Mos t comme n t a t or s  a g r e e  th a t  s u ch " d e f e n s i v e  t ac t i c s "  s h o u l d  be 
b a n n e d . 2 T h i s  pape r con s i d e r -a a mor e con t r ov e r s i a l  s t a t e 
r e s pon s e  to act i on s  by t a r g e t ma n a g e r s ,  proh i b i t i n g  t h e  r u n n i n g  
o f  a u c t ions a f t e r  a n  i n i t i a l  b i d  h a s  be e n  ma d e , A n  a u c t i o n  l s
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h e l d  w h e n  t a r g e t  ma n a geme n t  oppos e t h e  i n i t ia l bid a n d  can 
in t e r e s t  o t h e r  companie s in biddin g . To p r ohibit a n  a uc tion is 
a c t u a l l y to permit t h e  initia l b id d e r  to s e t  a time limit for 
t a r g e t  s h a r eho l d e r s  to r e spond to its of f e r  t h a t  is too b r ie f to 
pe rmi t  t h e  t a r g e t ' s  ma n a geme n t  to fin d o t h e r  bid d e r s . C u r r e n t  
l a w  now p e r mi t s  a uc tions b e ca u s e  i t  r e q u ir e s  b i d s  t o  b e  k e p t  ope n  
f o r  r e l a t iv e l y  lon g time p e r iod s a n d  a l so r e q uir e s  f i r m s  t h a t 
h a v e  t a k e n  s u b s t a n t ia l pos i t ions in pot e n tia l t a r g e t s  promp t l y  to 
disclos e t h e s e  pos i t ion s . 3 S uch promp t disclos u r e  ma y give
t a r g e t  m a n a g e me n t s  time to a r r a n g e  a uc tion s . O n l y  t wo l e g a l  
comme n t a tor s ,  P r of e s so r s  E a s t e r b rook a n d  F i s h e l ,  u r g e  a 
pr ohib i t ion o f  a uc t lon s . 4 This paper a d d s  a t hi r d  voice . 
E a s t e r b rook a n d  Fi s h e l  s t a t e  " t h e  b a sic ca s e "  a g ain s t  
a u c tion s . Some f irms s e a rch for a n d  acq u l r � misma n a g e d  companies 
b e ca u s e  a s ucce s s f u l  s e a r ch e r  can e a r n  t h e  d i f f e r e nc e  b e t w e e n  t h e  
" ma ximizing price , "  t h e  price for which t h e  t a r g e t ' s  s h a r e s  wil l 
s e l l  once i t  is r u n  to ma x imiz e ,  a n d  t h e  t a r g e t ' s  low e r  cu r r e n t  
m a r k e t  pr ice , which r e f l ec t s  i t s  s ub op tima l p e r formance . A n  
a uction s h r in k s  t h e  d if f e r e nc e  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  t w o  price s b eca u s e  
o t h e r  f irms wil l ov e r b id ini t ia l  o f f e r s  t h a t  a r e  c lo s e  t o  t h e  l ow 
c ur r e n t  price . Con s eq u e n t l y ,  a uc tion s  r e d uce t h e  r e t u r n s  t o  
s e a rch for misma n a g e d  comp a n i e s ; t h e  l es s  s e a r ch t h e r e  is , t h e  
l e s s  e f fectiv e i s  t h e  t a k eov e r  s a nction i n  ca u si n g  ma n a g e r s  to 
m a x imiz e s h a r e  v a l u e s . H e nce , a uc tions a r e  ine f f icie n t . 
T h e  ca s e  for a u c t ions b e gin s with t h e  ob v io u s  f a c t  t h a t t o  
prohib i t  t h e m  i s  to r e d uce sign ifica n t l y  t h e  pr ice t a r g e t  
s h a r ehol d e r s  r eceiv e  w h e n  t a k eov e r s  occu r .  T h e  ca s e  t h e n  r e s t s  
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on t h r e e  loos e l y  con n e c t e d  c l a l m s . 5 Fir s t ,  a l t h o u g h  a u c tion s  ma y 
r e d uce s e a r ch for misma n a g e d  companie s , t h e y  db n o t  r e d uce it 
b e low d e s ir a b l e  l e v e l s , or th eir e f f e c t  in t h is r e spect is 
ambiguou s . S econ d , a u c tions h e l p  move t a r g e t  a s s e t s to t h eir 
highe s t  v a l uin g u s er s ,  and t h u s  cr e a t e  e f ficie ncy gains t o  b e  se t 
a g a in s t  t h e  doub t f u l  e f ficie ncy los s e s  t h a t  a u c tions cr e a t e .  
T h ir d , t a r g e t s h a r e hol d e r s  h a v e  a prope r t y  r ig h t  t o  pa r t icip a t e  
in t h e  g a i n s  t h a t  a t a k e o v e r  mak e s  pos s ib l e . Wi t h ou t a u c tion s ,  
t h e  t a r g e t  s h a r e h ol d e r s  wou l d  cap t u r e  on l y  a sma l l  p a r t  o f  t h e s e  
gains;  t h u s , a u c tions h e l p  p r o t e c t  s h a r e h o l d e r  r ig h t s . 
Th a t  p l a u sib l e  a r g ume n t s  appa r e n t l y e x i s t on b o t h  sid e s  of 
the a u c tion i s s u e  ls pa r t l y  a f u n c t ion of the t e rms in which the 
d e b a t e  has b e e n  con d uc t e d . T ho u g h  the i s s u e  pos e s  a prob l e m  in 
the economics of s e ar ch , no d e b a t e  par ticipa n t  has u s e d  s e a r ch 
e q uilib r i u m  t h e o r y  to i l l u min a t e  t h e  q u e s t ion how s e a r ch for 
t a r ge t s  a c t u a l l y  in f l u e nce s ma n a g e r  b e h a v ior . P a r t  I b e l ow 
cr e a t e s  a mod e l  t h a t  a t t emp t s  to do t h is . T h e  mod e l  id e n t i f ie s  
s e v e r a l  f a c t or s t h a t  cor r e l a t e  posi t i v e l y  w i t h  t he lik e lihood 
t h a t  man a g e r s  wil l m a x imiz e ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  a l s o  c a n  
in f l u e nc e . R especting s e a rch , t h e  mod e l  s h ow s  t h a t  a uc tions 
u n ambig u o u s l y  r e d uce t h e  g ai n s  to s e a r ch for misma n a g e d  t a r g e t s , 
a n d  t h u s  u n amb i g uou s l y  r e d uce t he lik e l ihood t h a t  corpor a t e  
ma n a g e r s  wil l ma x imiz e s ha r e  v a l u e s . P a r t  I g o e s  on to a r g u e  
t h a t  t h e  mod e l ' s  conc l u sions a r e  r ob u s t  t o  t h e  r e l a x a tion of i t s  
mor e impor t a n t  a s s ump t ions a n d  conc l u d e s  b y  a t t emp ting t o  r e f u t e  
t h e  in forma l a r gume n t s  r e specting s e a r ch t h a t  a u c tion pr opon e n t s  
m a k e .  
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P a r t  I I  n e x t s h ows t h a t  a uc t ions co u l d  h e l p mov e  t a r g e t  
a s s e t s t o  tne i r  h i g h e s t  v a l u e d  u s e s  on ly i n  a l i m i t e d  s e t  of 
pot e n t i a l  t a k e ov e r s ,  t ho s e  for s y n e r g y  purpos e s  (appropr i a t e l y  
d e f i n e d ) .  T h e  c l a i m  t h a t  a u c t ions ac t u a l l y p e r for m th�s f u nct ion 
i n  s y n e r g y  acq u i s i t ion s ,  how e v e r , r e s t s  on d u b i o u s  a s s u mp t ions 
that  a uc t i on pr opon e n t s have ne i t h e r  a r t i cu l a t e d nor d e f e n de d .  
To e x pos e  t h e s e  a s s u mpt ions i s  to ca l l  t h e m  s e r i o u s l y  i n t o 
qu e s t ion . T h u s  t h e r e  i s  no r e a son n ow to b e l i e v e t h a t  a u c t ions 
ha v e  a compar a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e  ov e r  u n r e gu l a t e d  ma r k e t s  i n  mov i n g 
corpor a t e  a s s e t s  to t he i r  h i g h e s t  v a l u e d  u s e s . 
P a r t  I I I  n e x t  a r g u e s  t h a t  t a r g e t  s h a r e ho l d e r s  h a v e  no 
prope r t y  r i gh t t o  s h a r e  in t h e  ga i ns t h a t  t a k eov e r s  cr e a t e . 
R a t h e r , th e s e  s h a r e hol d e r s  a r e  e n t i t l e d  o n l y  to t h e  v a l u e  of 
t h e i r  s h a r e s  had no b i d b e e n  ma d e . S i nce t e n d e r  of f e r s  g i ve t h e m  
mor e t h a n  th i s ,  a r i g h t s  cl a i m  cannot s u ppor t t h e  ca s e  for 
a uc t i o n s . P a r t  I V  t h e n  m a k e s  conc l ud i n g  r e m a r k s  a n d  specu l a t e s  
br i e f l y  a b o u t  t h e  l e ga l i t y of now common a me n d me n t s  t o  corpor a t e  
ch a r t e r s  a n d  b y l a w s ,  t h a t  a l so m a y  r e d uce t h e  f r e q u e ncy of 
t a k eov e r s .  
T h i s  pape r t h u s  conc l u d e s  t h a t  t h e  b a s i c  ca s e  a ga i n s t  
a uc t i on s  i s  cor r ec t  w h e n  for ma l l y  e v a l u a t e d  i n  a n  i mpe r f e c t  
i n for m a t i on s e t t i n g , b u t  t h e  concl u s i on s h o u l d  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  
pr e l i m i n a r y . L i t t l e  wor k h a s  b e e n  don e r e l a t i ng s e a rch 
eq u i l i b r i u m  t h e o r y  to ma r k e t s  for corpor a t e  con t r ol; t h e  mod e l  i n  
P a r t  I i s  t h e  f i r s t  t o  i ncorpor a t e  t h i s  t h eo r y  i n to t h e  t e n d e r  
o f f e r  d e b a t e , a n d  t h e n  i n  r e l a t i v e l y  pr i m i t i v e  f a s h i on . 
T h e r e for e ,  t h e  paper ' s  more f i r m l y  g r oun d e d  conc l u s i on i s  t h a t  
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the b u r d e n  of per s u a s ion shou l d  s h i f t . A u c t ion propon e n t s  m u s t  
now show t h a t  t h e i r  c l a i m s  a r e  s u s t a i n a b l e  i n  t h e  mor e r i ch l y  
d e sc r i b e d wor l d  d i sc u s s e d  b e low . 
I .  A T a k eov e r  Mod e l  
A ,  T h e  Mod e16 
E n t r epr e n e u r s  b r i n g " pr o d uc t s " to m a r k e t . T h e s e  prod uc t s  
a r e  par t l y  con s t i t u t e d  b y  a proj e c t  a p l a n  t o  e a r n  m o n e y  --
a n d  a f i r m  a s e t  of pr opos e d  con t r ac t s  b e t w e e n  t h e  
e n t r epr e n e u r s  a n d  pot e n t i a l  cap i t a l  s uppl i e r s .  T h e  m a r k e t  for 
t h e s e  prod uc t s  i s  compe t i t i v e ,  so t h a t  e ach s e t  of e n t r epr e n e u r s  
i s  compe l l e d  to propos e con t r ac t s  t h a t m i n i m i z e a g e nc y  cos t s  for 
i t s f i r m . 7 The pr od uc t a spec t s  j u s t  d e scr i b e d  a r e  a s e a r ch good; 
pot e n t i a l  i n ve s tor s can ob s e r v e  t h e  pl a n s  for proj e c t s  a n d  t h e  
s e t s  of con t r ac t s . 8 T h e  prod uc t s ,  howe v e r , h a v e  a n  e xper i e nce
a spec t . A s  a g e nc y  cos t s  c a n n o t  b e  r e d uc e d  to z e r o ,  t h e  
e n t r epr e n e u r s , who b e come o r  h i r e  m a n a ge r s ,  m a y  not ca u s e  t h e  
s h a r e  v a l u e s  of t h e i r  on g o i n g  f i r m s  t o  b e  m a x i m i z e d , T h e  
comm i t m e n t  t o  m a x i m i z i n g  s h a r e  v a l u e s  cons t i t u t e s  t h e  e xper i e nce 
a spect; a n  i n v e s tor who b u y s  s tock i n  a f i r m  m u s t  w a i t  t o  s e e . 
L a t e r , t h e  ma n a g e r s  of a t  l e a s t  some f i rms f a l l  from g r ace , and 
w i l l  n o t  m a x i m i z e  t h e  s h a r e  v a l u e s  of t h e i r  f i r m s  u n l e s s  t h e  
m a r k e t  compe l s  t h e m  t o . I s ha l l  shor t l y  d i scu s s  w h a t  " compe l le d "  
m e a n s. Some f i r m s  t h a t a r e  not m a x i m i z i n g  s h a r e  v a l u e s  w i l l  
d i s appe a r  t h r o u g h  t a k e o v e r  or a t t r i t i on , b u t  e n t r epr e n e u r s  
con t i n uou s l y  come t o  ma r k e t  w i t h n e w  produc t s , s o  a " con t i n uous 
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f low " e xis t s . T his pape r ' s  conc e r n  is with a s lice of time 
within t h e  f low , in t h a t  it a s k s  w h a t  wou l d  comp e l  mana g e r s  who 
9 h a v e  f a l l e n  f r om g r ace to m a x imiz e s h a r e  v a l u e s . 
B e for e r e aching thi s q u e s tion , it wil l b e  h e l p f u l  to a s k  how 
t h e  f ai l u r e  to ma x imiz e is t roub l e some . L e t N f ir m s  e x is t ,  e ach 
of which h a s  a s e t  of ma n a g e r s  who d e cid e w h a t  i t  doe s , a n d  a s e t  
o f  s h a r ehol d e r s  who a r e  l a r g e l y  p a s s iv e . T h e  s ha r e h ol d e r s  ma y 
s e l l  s tock if a bid is ma d e  to t h e m .  T h e  man a g e r s ,  for 
simplici t y , a r e  a s s umed to be ris k n e u t r a l; t h e y  m a x imiz e  
e xp ec t e d  l i f e time e a r nin g s . I f  t his pr e f e r e nce l e a d s  t h em not to 
m a x imiz e  s h a r e v a l u e s , t h e y  m a y  act in e i t h e r  of t w o  w a y s: Fir s t ,  
ma x imiz e t h e  t o t a l  we a l t h  t h a t  t h e ir firms ' a s s e t s  can g e n e r a t e  
b u t  d e v ot e  a s u b s t a n t ia l por t ion of t h is w e a l t h  to t h e ms e l v e s  in 
t h e  form of p e r k s  and s a l a r y . S h a r e  v a l u e s wou l d  t h e n  be lower 
than had the ma n a g e r s  not " s k imme d . "  T his s t r a t e gy d o e s  ma ximi z e  
firm w e a l t h b u t  cou l d  b e  in e f ficie n t  b e ca u s e  t h e  l ow e r e d  s h a r e  
v a l u e s ma y dampe n in v e s t me n t  i n  p a r t icu l a r  i n d u s t r i e s  b e low 
socia l l y opt ima l l e v e l s .  A l s o ,  if ma n a g e r s  a r e  ov e r comp e n s a t e d , 
t h e r e  ma y e xis t an e x c e s siv e s upp l y  of mana g er s .  S e con d , 
ma ximi z e  n ei t h e r  s h a r e  v a l u e s  nor firm w e a l t h . T h is s t r a t e g y  
ob viou s l y is in e f ficie n t  b ecau s e  i t  r e d uc e s  t h e  t o t a l  w e a l t h  
a v ail a b l e  t o  socie t y .  S ince on e s t r a t e g y  t h a t  f ail s t o  ma x imiz e 
s h a r e  v a l u e s is i n e f f icie n t  a n d  t h e  ot h e r  s t r a t e gy l s  prob a b l y 
s o ,  I s uppo s e  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e ' s  goa l , ce t .  par , s ho u l d  b e  to cau s e  
ma n a g e r s  t o  a c t  optima l l y .  
I f  t h e  man a g e r s  do ma x imi z e , t h e y  e a r n  s *  per y e a r  for e v e r  
( u n ti l  r e tir eme n t) . I f  t h e y  d o  not , t h e y  e a r n  mor e ,  s ,  b u t  t h e i r  
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companie s ma y b e  t a k e n  ov e r  b e ca u s e  s h a r e  v a l u e s  a r e  l o w e r  t h a n  
w h e n  t h e  man a g e r s  m a x imiz e . A f t e r  a t ak eov e r , t h e  non m a x imiz ing 
ma n a g e r s  lose t h e ir jobs and g e t  o t h e r  jobs , e a r nin g s, w h e r e  s < s* < 
H e nce , t h e ma n a g e r s ' e x pec t e d  u t i l i t y  can b e  wr i t t e n :  E m (U ) = f (s , r , x )  
w h e r e  r i s  t h e  ma n a g e r s ' disco u n t  r a t e  a n d  l s  t h e  prob a b i l i t y  
t h a t  a nonma x l m l zing ma n a g e r  wi l l  los e h i s  j ob . T h e  d i s co u n t  
r a t e  i s  e x o g e n eou s a n d  a s s u me d id e n t ica l for a l l  man a g e r s .  This 
way of vie wing the f ir m  s u ppos e s  s h a r ehol d e r s  to h a v e  no con t rol 
ov e r  ma n a g e r  con d uc t , an a s sµmp t lon t h a t  is r e l a x e d  som e w h a t  
b e low . 
I f  t h e  ma n a g e r s  m a x imiz e ,  t h e  f l r � ' s  s tock s e l l s a t  p * ;  if 
t h e y  do not , t h e  s tock s e l l s a t  p < � * ·  B o t h  pr ice s a ccu r a t e l y 
r e f l e c t  t h e  f ir m ' s  e xpec t e d  e a r n in g s  u n d e r  cu r r e n t  ma n a g e me n t  . .  
T h e  ma r k e t  c a n not in f e r  a fail u r e  to m a x imiz e f rom t h e  
nonma x imiz i n g  pric e  a lon e , u n l e s s  p f a l l s  so f a r  t h a t  t h e  
e x is t e nce of s ubop�ima l b e h a v ior is o b v iou s ,  W h a t  is me a n t  h e r e  
i s  t h a t  t h e  s e mi- s t rong form o f  t h e  e f ficie n t  ma r k e t  h y po t h e s i s  
hold s ,  wh i l e  t h e  f a il u r e  o f  ma n a g e r s  to m a x imiz e ,  u n l e s �  g r a v e , 
is " in sid e r  in forma tion . « 1 0 B y  " g r a v e "  is me a n t  t h a t  an ob s e r v e r
o f  t h e  fir m c a n  a t  z e r o  cos t r e a l l y v e r y  l ow cos t --k n ow t h e  
t r u e  f a ct s . C a l l  this limi tin g low e r  s h a r e  pric e  p. T h e
man a g e r s  t h u s  k now t h a t  i f  t h e y  a l l ow pr ice t o  f a l l  to p ,  t h e y  
a r e  ce r t ain to b e  ou s t e d  b y  anot h e r  firm o r  t h e ir own 
s h a r e h o l der s .  I n  con s e q u e nce , man a g e r s  who choo s e  not to 
ma x imiz e ma y a l low s h a r e  pric e s  to f a l l  to p + e ,  w h e r e  e > O; 
s u ch a price is ca l l e d  L .  A l s o ,  t h e r e  is a p r e mium a b o v e  t h e  
f irm ' s  cu r r e n t  ma r k e t  price t h a t wou l d  ind uce t h e  s h a r e ho l d e r s  t o  
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s ell to a t a k eo v e r  b i d d e r .  L e t th i s  pr e m i u m  b e  0 .  1 1
A f i rm ' s  ma n a g e r s  may the n pu r s u e  e i ther o f  t wo non­
m a x i m i z i n g  s t r a t e g i e s . f i r s t ,  they could ca u s e  sha r e  pr i c e s  to 
fall by p* - p < 0 .  Then p* - (p + 0) < O ,  so t h a t  a n  acqu i r e r
which pa i d  the pr e m i u m  above the t a r g e t f i r m's ma r k e t  pr ice 
n ece s s a r y  to i n d uc e  the shar ehold e r s  to t e n d e r  -- 0 - - wou ld e a r n  
n e ga t i v e  r e t u r n s . Thi s i s  t h e  s a f e  s t r a�e gy b eca u s e  i t  e n s u r e s  
tha t n o  t a k eov e r  b i d s  would b e  m a d e . The m a n a g e r s  also cou ld 
ca u s e  sha r e  v a lu e s  to f a ll to L .  Th i s  is t he r i s k y  s t r a t e gy 
b e ca u s e  the n p* - ( L  + 0 )  > O ;  that i s ,  a m i s m a n a g e d  f i r m  w i ll 
alw a y s  be d e s i r a ble to on e who d i sc e r n s  the m i s m a n a g e me n t  b e ca u s e  
a b u y e r  could e a r n  pos i t i ve r e t u r n s . M a n a g e r s  who choose the 
r i s k y  s t r a t e g y thus a r e  l i k ely to prof i t  only i f  no one f i n d s  
ou t .  The r i s k y  s t r a t e g y  i s  a s s u m e d  alw a y s  t o  g e n e r a t e  g r e a t e r  
r e t u r n s  for m a n a g e r s  t h a n  the s a f e  s t r a t e gy for t wo r e a son s . 
f i r s t ,  i t  j u s t i f i e s  the proble m .  W e r e  the a s s u mp t ion othe r w i s e ,  
the thr e a t  o f  a t a k eov e r  n e v e r  could che c k  m a n a g e r  b e ha v ior , y e t  
mos t b e l i e v e  tha t t a k eo v e r s  m a y  per for m a check i n g  f u nc t ion . To 
t a k e  th i s  b el i e f s e r i o u s ly i mpl i e s  the a s s u m p t i o n  tha t 
non m a x i m i z i n g  m a n a g e r �  alwa y s  -- or a t  l ea s t  v e r y  o f t e n  -- choose 
the r i s k y  s t r a t e gy . S e con d ,  the d e ma n d  e la s t ic i t y for sha r e s  i s  
v e r y  h i gh .  Thu s , i n  a n  u n r e g u la t e d ma r k e t  the pr e m i u m n e ce s s a r y 
to i n d uce t e n d e r  m a y  b e  low . S i nce the nonma x i m i z i n g  s t r a t e gy i s  
s a f e  only when p *  - ( p  + 0 )  < 0 ,  whe n 0 i s  low the i n e qu a l i t y  
ca n not hold unle s s  p i s  v e r y  clo s e  to p* . T h i s  i mpl i e s  tha t the 
ou t come s  of the s a f e  s t r a t e g y  approx i m a t e  the ou t come s of the 
max i m i z i n g  s t r a t e gy . The r e for e ,  ma n a g e r  f a i lu r e  to m a x i m i z e  
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p u r s u a n t  to the s a f e  s t r a t e gy pos e s  pol icy prob l e m s  too s l i ght to 
d i scu s s . A n d  for the s e t wo r e a sons I s u ppos e  that m a n a g e r s
e i th e r  m a x i m i z e  or pu r s u e  the r i s k y  s t r a t e g y . 
The r e  also e x i s t s a s u b s e t  of f i r m s  i n  N, calle d A ,  who a r e
look i n g  for o t h e r  f i r m s  to b u y . E a ch m e m b e r  o f  A c a n , a t  a cos t  
c ,  le a r n  whe ther a f i r m  i n  N i s  b e i n g r un s u b op t i m a lly; that i s ,  
a m i s m a n a g e d  f i r m  i s  a s e a r ch good i n  tha t the f i r m ' s  t r u e  v al u e  
- p* - i s  r e v e aled to whom e v e r p a y s  t he " f e e . " T h e  f i r m s  i n  A 
can b e  pa r t i t ion e d  accor d i n g  to the i r  s e a r ch b eha v ior . f i r s t  a r e  
" ca s u a l  s e a r che r s " ; the s e  a r e  f i rm s  t h a t  d o  not ha v e  a n  
acqu i s i t io n s  prog r a m  b u t  p e r iod ically a n aly z e  other f i r m s  i n  
t he i r  e n v i r on m e n t  t o  s e e  whe t h e r  a " b a r ga i n "  - - a m i s m a n a g e d  f i r m  
- - e x i s t s . C a s u al s e a r che r s  w i ll b u y  b a r g a i n s . S e cond a r � 
" s y n e r g y s e a r che r s . "  S y n e r g y  acqu i s i t io n s  a r e  i llu s t r a t e d  b y  
hor i zon t a l ,  v e r t ical o r  prod u c t  e x t e n s ion m e r g e r s .  T h e  i d e a  i s  
t h a t  t wo pa r t i cular f i rm s  w i ll do b e t t e r  comb i n e d  t h a n  e ach would 
do s e pa r a t ely . H e nce , a g i v e n f i r m  tha t a c t u ally d o e s  ma x i m i z e  
sha r e  v alu e s  r e ma i ns a t a r g e t  for a l i m i t e d  s e t  o f  o t h e r  f i r m s  
tha t ca n b e  s y n e r g i s t i cally com b i n e d  w i th i t .  Th i s  la t t e r  s e t  of 
f i r m s  are the s y n e r g y  s e a rche r s , but  i t  is  a s s u m e d  t h a t  t h e y  also 
w ill p i c k  up a b a r g a i n  i f  the i r  e valu a t ion s r e v e al on e .  f i n ally , 
some f i r m s  i n  A a r e  s e a rch i n g spec i f i cally for b a r g a i n s . The 
f i r m s  i n  A can b e  pa r t i t io n e d  in a s e con d w a y . Som e of the m ,  
pr i ma r i ly t he ca s ual s e a rche r s , t a k e  one d r a w p e r  p e r iod ; they 
e v alu a t e only one othe r f i r m  to s e e  whe the r a b a r g a i n  or a 
s y n e r g y  pa r t n e r  e x i s t s .  O the r f i r m s  i n  A t a k e  n > 2 d r a w s  p e r  
per iod . C a ll t h e  for m e r  s e t  of f i r m s  A 1 a n d  t h e  la t t e r  A 2 whe r e
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A1 + A 2 2 A .  
T h e  f i r ms i n  A d o  no t ne c essar i l y  m a x i m i z e t h e i r  own sh a r e  
v a l u es . F i rms th a t  f a i l  t o  m a x i m i z e s t i l l  m a k e pr o d u c ts ,  se l l  
serv i c es and s o  f o r t h ,  and t h e y  m a y  a lso se a r ch f o r and pu r c h as e  
o t h e r  f i r ms t h a t  a r e  r un s u b opt i m a l l y .  A s e a r c h e r ,  w h e t h e r  o r  
no t i t  m a x i m i z e s  i ts o w n  sh a r e  va l u e s ,  m a y  eng a g e  i n  a va r i e t y  o f  
post - a c q uis i t i on c o nd u c t  t h a t  c o u l d  j us t i f y  se a r c h. F o r  e x ampl e ,  
t h e  s e a r c h e r  m a y  want t o  inc r e as e  t h e  w e a l t h  t h a t  a nonma x imizlng 
t a r g e t c an g e ne r a t e j ust to s k i m  i t ,  to se l l  s u c h  a t a r g e t  to a 
f i r m w h i c h w i l l  m a x i m i z e  i ts va l u e , to m a x i m i z e  a t a r g e t ' s  sh a r e  
va l u es itse l f ,  o r  f o r  o t h e r  r e asons. 
T h e  l aw t h a t  o b t ains is ini tia l l y  assu m e d  t o  b e  p r e -W i l liams 
A c t; a c q ulr e rs c an k e ep t e n d e r  o f f e rs open for as sh o r t  a t i me as 
t h e y  p l e as e , and ne e d  no t r ev e a l  posi t i ons t h e y  h ave t a k en i n  
T o  iso l a t e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a u c t i ons , it a lso i s  po t ent i a l  t a r g e ts. 
assu m e d  t h a t  mana g e r s  c anno t  use d e f e ns i ve t a c tics .  H enc e , t h e  
m ana g e rs o f  a f i r m  i n  N know t h a t  i f  t h e  se a r c h  o f  a f i r m i n  A 
r eve a l s  t he i r  f i r m  t o  b e  r u n  sub optlma l l y ,  t h e  s e a r c h e r  wil l b u y  
i t .  T h e  pr o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  a nonm a xim i zlng fir m wi l l  b e  f o und is 
• x .  
M ana g e rs d o  no t k no w  t h a t t h eir firms h av e  b e e n  se a r c h e d  u n l ess a 
b i d is m a d e . T h u s ,  f r om t h e i r  po i n t  o f  vie w , in a seve r a l  p e r i o d  
f r a m e wo r k , x i • _
xj f o r a l l  i , j  and x i ' x j a r e
 ind ependent . 
R e c a l l  t h a t t h e  s h a r e h o l d e rs a r e  ass u m e d  t o  t en d e r  i f  t h e y  
a r e  o f f e r e d a t  l e as t  L + 0, and su c c essf u l  se a r c h e r s  a l ways
b u y . T h us ,  the only d e c isionm a k e rs in t h i s  w o r l d  a r e  t h e  
-10-
managers of  f i r ms i n  N.  T h e y w i l l  m a x i m i z e  o r  no t ,  d e pe n d i n g  on 
wh i c h  s t r a t e g y  y i e l ds the h i g h es t  l i f e t i m e  e a r n ings . L e t E ( Y ) a  
b e  t h e e x pe c t e d  e a r n i ngs f r o m  ma x i m i z i ng . A m an a g e r  w h o  
m a x i m i z es w i l l  e a rn s *  f o r eve r . T h us 
( 1 )  E ( Y ) a  = s*/r . 
L e t  E ( Y ) b  be t h e  e x pe c t e d  g a i n  f r o m  no t m a x i m i z i ng . To c a l c u l a t e
E ( Y ) b  s e e  t h a t  t h e  pr o b a b i l i t y  o f  b e i ng c a u gh t i n  per i o d  one ls x 
and o f  b e i n g  c a u g h t  in pe r i o d  t w o  is ( 1  - xlx and so fo r t h. I f  
t h e  m ana g e r  ls c a u g h t  in p e r i o d  one , h e  e a r ns i/r f o r eve r ; i f  h e  
i s  c a u g h t  i n  p e r io d  t wo , h e  e ar ns s + s/r ( 1  + r ) .
T h us :  
( 2 )  E ( Y ) b  • + s + • • • s ] 
(i"-:-;:) 2 
-----1 
r ( r +1 )  
T h e  m an a g e r s  w i l l  m a xim i ze i f  ( 1 )  > ( 2 ) . 
C o mparing ( 1 )  and ( 2 )  i n i t ia l l y  shows t h a t  man a g e r  disc o u n t  
r a t e s  a r e  impo r t an t .  F o r  a s u f ficie n t l y  l o w  dis c o unt r a t e , 
e q ua t i on ( 1 )  w i l l  e x c e e d  e q u a tion ( 2 ) . H o w e ve r , ( 1 )  - ( 2 )  
d e c r e ases mono t oni c a l l y  w i th inc r e ases i n  r ,  so t h a t , as t h e  
f o o t no t e  s h o ws , f o r  a su f flti i e n t l y  h i g h d is c o un t  r a t e , ( 2 )  > (1) 
t h e  m ana g e r s  w i l l no t m a x i m i z e .  1 2  I n t u i t ive l y , i f  t h e  p r esent
is m u c h  m o r e i mpor t an t  t o  mana g e rs t han the f u t u r e  a h i g h  r 
t h e y  w i l l weigh t pr es e n t  r e t u rns m o r e  h e avi l y  t h an f u t u r e  
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r e t u r ns ,  a n d  so b e  m o r e  lik e l y  to c h o ose s ,  t h e r e t u r n  f r o m  t h e  
n o n m a x imizing s t r a t e g y . C o n v e r s e l y , if m a n a g e r s  c a r e  a b o u t  t h e  
f u t u r e  ( r  i s  l o w ) , t h e y  wil l p r e f e r  t o  e nsu r e  t h e mse l ves a 
r e l a tiv e l y  high i n c o m e  - - s* -- f o r e v e r .  
To p e r c ei v e  t h e  o t h e r  l esso ns , s u p p o s e  a o n e  p e riod f r a m e wo r k ,
in which disc o u n t  r a t e s  c a n  b e  i g n o r e d , F o r  o n e  p e r io d , t h e  g ain 
from ma ximizin g is s* and from not is (1 - xl s  + xs .
T h us , w e  g e t  
( 3 ) M a x  i f f  s* � ( 1  - xls + xs. 
This sa ys t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  m a x imizin g is hig h e r  if s is n o t  
v e r y  m u c h  g r e a t e r  t h a n  s* , if s *  is l a r g e  r e l a ti v e  t o  s a n d  i f  x is 
hig h .  T h e r e fo r e ,  ma n a g e rs a r e  mo r e  lik e l y  t o  ma x imi z e  sh a r e  v a l u es 
i f  ( a )  t h eir disc o u n t  r a t e s  a r e  l o w ; {b ) t h e r e  a r e  f e w  p e r ks t o  
c o nsume ( s  is c l ose i n  v a l uEJ t o  s* ) ;  ( c )  t he c o ns e q u e n c es t o
ma n a g e r s  o f  b eing fo u n d  o u t  a r e  se r io us ( s* i s  m u c h  big g e r  t h e ns ) ;
( d ) t h e  p r o b a bili t y  o f  m a n a g e rs b ei n g  ous t e d  f r o m  o f fic e if t h e y  
f a i l  t o  ma x imiz e is hig h ( c o nsid e r a b l e  sea r c h ·o c c u rs ) ; a n d  ( e ) 
m a n a g e r s  a r e  risk a v e rse, R esp e c ting {e ) ,  the a n a l ysis assu m e d  
r isk n e u t r a li t y , b u t  r isk a v e rsio n o b vio usly imp lies a g r e a t e r  
p r o b abili t y  o f  m a ximiz i n g  b e h a v io r ; a m a ximizing s t r a t e g y  r e d u c e s  
t h e  v a ria n c e  i n  ma n a g e rs' r e t u r ns ,  f o r  t hey ea r n  s *  f o r e v e r  r a t h e r
t h a n  s f o r  a n  u n cer t ain p e r iod a n d  t h e n  p e r haps s . 
This a n a l ysis s u p p o r t s  se v e r a l  p u b lic p o lic y 
r e c o m men d a tions . T h e  s t a t e c a n n o t  a f f e c t  ( e )  in a s t r aigh t fo r w a r d  
wa y b u t  c a n  in f l u e n c e t h e  o t h e r  f o u r f a c t o r s  m o r e  o r  l ess 
d ir e c t l y .  I t  has c o nsid e r a b l e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  e x p e c t e d  f u t u r e  
in t e r es t  r a t es . Assuming w e l l - f u n c tio ning c a p i t a l  ma r k e ts ,  l o w e r  
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e x p e c t e d  in t e r es t  r a tes im p l y  l o w e r  s u b j e c ti v e  m a n a g e r  disc o u n t  
r a t e s  a t  t h e  m a r gin . T h u s ,  a m a c r o  p o li c y  o f  l o w e r i n g  in t e r est 
r a t es has the a d d i tio n a l  b e ne fi t  o f  in c r e asin g  the lik e lihood t h a t 
m a n a g e rs wil l ma ximi z e  s h a r e  v a l u es ,  R esp e c ting f a c t o r  ( b ) ,  t h e  
s t a t e  c a n  in c r ease t h e  t a x a ti o n  o f  p e r ks .  This i s  lik e l y  t o  
r e d u c e s - s *  m o r e  t h a n  it wi l l  r e d u c e  s* - s ,  ho l ding L fix e d ; if
so , t h e  lik e lih o o d  t h a t m a n a g e rs wil l m a ximi z e  a gain is 
in c r ease d . As r e g a r ds f a c t o r  ( c ) , g o l d e n  p a r a c h u t e  c o n t r a c ts 
c ushio n t h e  c o ns e q u e n c es to n o n ma x imizin g m a n a g e rs o f  b e in g f o u n d  
o u t ; t h e y in c r ease s r e l a ti v e  t o  s* a n d  s o  d e c r e ase t h e  lik e lihood
t h a t m a n a g e rs wil l  ma ximi z e .  T h e r e f o r e , s u c h  c o n t r a c ts s h o u l d  b e  
h e l d  u n e n f o r c e a b l e . 1 3 Fin a l l y , t h e  �Ca t e  m a y  wish t o  i n c r e ase a n d
c e r t ai n l y  w o u l d  n o t  wish t o  r e d u c e  x b e c a us e  t h e  lik e lih o o d  o f
b ei n g  f o u n d  o u t  c o r r e l a t e s  p osi tiv e l y  wi th t h e  lik e l i h o o d  t h a t 
m a n a g e rs wil l maximi z e  s h a r e  v a l u es .  
T h e  se a r ch iss u e  d es er v es mo r e  c o nsid e r a tion . A b o v e ,  I 
ass u m e d a fix e d  sa m p l e  siz e  se a r c h  s t r a t e g y  w h e r e  t he samp l e  siz es 
w e r e  e x o g e n e o us l y  se t .  N o w  I w a n t  t o  c o nsid e r  wha t m a y  in f l u e n c e  
t h e  samp l es ,  a n d  a lso r e l a x  t he lega l assu m p tio ns . S e a r c h  h e r e  is 
a n a l o g o us t o  d r a wi n g  b a l ls f r o m  an u r n : a fir m in A t a k es o n e  o r  n 
d r a ws f r o m  N ,  b u yin g if a fir m " d r a wn" is s u c h  t h a t  p* - ( L  + 0 )  > 
0 .  L e t  e a c h  s e a r c h e r  b e lie v e  t h e  pr o b a bi l i t y  o f  ge t ti n g  s u c h  a 
fir m o n  o n e  d r aw t o  b e  0 w h e r e  0 is ass u m e d  i d e n ti c a l  f o r  a l l  fir ms 
in A .  H e n c e , the p r o b a bi l i t y  t h a t  a se a r c h e r  wi l l  find a 
mism a n a g e d  firm in n d r aws is 0[1 + ( 1-0 ) + 1-0 ) 2  + . . .  ( 1 -0 ) n -l ] , 
w hi c h is c a l l e dµ .  14 H e r e  0 is a f u n c tio n o f  t h e  a c t u a l
dis t r ib u tion p l us n oise ; tha t is , e a c h  se a r c h e r  h a s  a p ri o r  b e lie f 
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t h a t  i s  re l a t e d  t o  b u t  i s  n o t  c o e x t e n s i v e  w i th t h e  a c t u a l  
d i s tr i bu t i o n  o f  f i rms i n  N .  A l s o ,  l e t  A b e  t h e  probab i l i t y t h a t
t h e  firs t s e archer t h a t f i n d s  a n  u n derv a l u e d  f irm bu y s  i t .  
Abov e ,  A n e c e s s ar i l y  e q u a l l e d  o n e  be c a u s e , g i v e n  l arg e n u mbers , 
w o u l d  be u n l i k e l y  for t w o  s e ar c h e rs to f i n d  t h e  same m i s ma n a g e d  
f irm a t  o n c e , a n d  b e c a u s e  t h e  ma n a g ers were a s s u m e d  barred from 
u s i n g  d e f e n s i v e  t a c t i c s . I f  a u c t i o n s  are p erm i t t e d ,  t he f irs t 
s e arc h e r  may n o t  pre v a i l .  Sh o u l d  t h e  ma n a g ers o f  a t arge t 
it 
i n i t i a l  b i d' o t h e r  f irms i n  A w i l l  t h e n  k no w  t h a t a p ubl i c i z e  t h e  
n o n ma x i m i z i n g f irm h a s  b e e n  f o u n d , a n d  m a y  aba n d o n  t h e i r  r a n d om 
draw s earch s tra t e gy t o  b i d  for i t .  W i th s e v era l b i d d ers i t  c o u l d  
b e  t h a t  A < 1 . A l s o ,  l e t  c ( n )  be t he c o s t f u n c t i o n  for s e arc h ,
w here c ' ( n )  a n d  c " ( n )  > O .  Se arch c o s t s  i n c l u d e  t h e  c o s t  o f  
f i n d i n g f i rms t o  e v a l u a t e  a n d  o f  e v a l u a t i n g t he m  -- t h e  c abo v e . 
I f  a s earcher c a n  bu y for i ts ori g i n a l  b i d , i t s g a i n  gro s s  o f  
s e arc h co s t s i s  o f  c o u r s e  p *  - ( L  + 0). 
There n o w  are t w o  c a s es t o  c o n s i d e r .  F i rs t ,  s u p p o s e ,  a s  
i Pre-W i l l i ams A c t a n d  d e f e n s i ve t a c t i c s· �re· abo v e , t h a t  t h e  l a w  s 
ban n e d .  L e t  E ( G ) n  be t h e  n e t  e x p e c t e d  g a i n  t o  s e ar c h  for a f irm i n  
A .  T h e n ,
(4) E ( G ) n  • 
n n I:µH H • 3Z ( p * - ( L  + H�l 
0)) - c ( n ) . 
n w here H ls t h e  n umber o f  m i sma n a g e d  f irms re v e a l e d  i n  n draws , µH
i s  t h e  probab i l i t y o f  f i n d i n g  H f irms , Z i s  t h e  t o t a l  n umber o f  
e a c h  t arge t ' s  s h are s a n d  a i s  t h e  frac t i o n  o f  s u c h  o u t s t an d i n g 
shares t h a t t h e  s e a r c h e r  i n t e n d s  t o  p urch a s e .  15 S e archers s e t . 5
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< a < 1 • Ne x t  s u p p o s e  t ha t ,  i f  t h e  same s ea r c h e r  f i n d s  a 
m i sma n a g e d  f irm , a n  a u c t i o n  w i l l  be c o n d u c t e d . I f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  
b i d d er l o s e s , i t  c a n  s e l l  a n y  s h ar e s  i t  a c q u i r e d  t o  t h e  w i nn e r .  
L e t  " t h e  l o s i n g b i d d er a c q u ire a Z  s h ares w h ere 0 < a . 5 .  A n
a u c t i o n  w i l l  pro d u c e  a f i n a l  bi d pri c e  t h a t i s  h i g h er t h a n  t h e  
or i g i n a l  pr i c e ( L  + 0), f or t h e  ori g i n a l  pri c e  p r e s umabl y i s  t h e
l o w e s t  pr i c e  a t  w h i c h  t h e  s h ar e h o l d ers c a n  b e  i n d u c e d  t o  t e n d e r .  
L e t  p '  b e  t h e  pr i c e  a t  w h i c h  t h e  w i n n er b u y s . T h e n  i f  E ( G ) a  ls t h e  
n e t  e x p e c t e d  g a i n  t o  s earch w h e n  a u c t i o n s  are p ermi t t e d ,  
( 5 )  E ( G ) a  • {u<a-a ) Z ( p *  
A) aZ ( p' - ( L 
- p '  ) + aZ ( p * 
+ 0 ) ) } - c ( n ) - ( L + 0 ) ) ] + 
T h e  t erm i n  bra c k e t s  t ha t  A m u l t i p l i e s  i s  t h e  g a i n  t o  t h e
ori g i n a l  b i d d e r  i f  i t  w i n s  t h e  a u c t i o n ; t h e  t e rm t h a t  (1 - A) 
mu l t i p l i e s  i s  t h e  g a i n  t o  t h e  b i d d er i f  i t  l o s e s  t h e  a u c t i o n bu t 
s e l l s  i t s s h ar e s  t o  t h e  w i n n er .  16 I f  (4) > ( 5) ,  t h e n  t h e  n e t
e x p e c t e d  g a i n  t o  s e arch i s  h i g h e r  w h e n  n o  a u c t i on s  are 
p erm i t t e d . I n  mak i n g t h i s  comp ar i s o n , the c o s t  of s e arch dro p s  
o u t  a s  i t  i s  i d e n t i c a l  i n  bo t h  ( 4 )  a n d  ( 5 ) . A l s o , t h e  µ t e rm 
dro p s  o ut a s  i t  m u l t i p l i e s  e v ery t h i n g bu t t h e  c o s t f u n c t i o n  i n  
bo t h  equa t i o n s . T t  i s  c o n v e n i e n t  t o  r e wr i t e  (4) a n d  ( 5 )  w i t h o u t
t h e s e  t erms . 
( 4)' ( a - a ) Z ( p * - ( L  + 0 ) ) + aZ( p* - ( L  + 0 ) ) 
( 5 )  I A [ ( a - a ) Z ( p *  - p ' ) ]  + aZ( p* - ( L  + 0 ) ) 
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T h e  s e c o n d  t erm i s  i d e n t i c a l  i n  ( 4 ) '  a n d  ( 5 ) ' a n d  c a n  be 
i gnore d . Le t p '  = p*; t h e  a uc t i o n , s u p p o s e ,  forc e s  pr i c e to t h e  
v a l u e  t h e t arg e t w o u l d  ha v e  h a d  i f  i t s ma n ag ers ma x i m i z e d  s h a re 
v a l u e s . T h e n  t h e  f i rs t t erm i n  ( 5 ) ' g o e s  t o  z ero wh i l e t h e  f i rs t 
term i n  ( 4 ) '  rema i n s  p o s i t i v e ,  s o  t h a t  ( 4 ) '  > (5)'. H e n c e ,  ( 4 )  > 
( 5 ) ,  T h i s  i s  u n s urpri s i n g  be c a u s e  ( 4 )  repres e n t s  t h e  v a l u e  t o  
t h e  or i g i n a l  b i d d e r  o f  o w n i n g� t han ha l f  o f  a f i rm bo u g h t  a t  
o n l y  L + 0 wh i l e ,  s u p p o s i n g p ' � p* , ( 5 )  r e f l e c t s  t h e  v a l u e t o  
th i s  b i d der o f  o w n i n g  l e s s  t h a n  h a l f  o f  a f irm bo u g h t  a t  t h i s  
p r i c e  a n d  own i n g  t h e  rema i n d er a t  n o  n e t  g a i n  a t  a l l , i f  i t  i s  
a c t u a l l y  purch a s e d. 
T h e  a s sump t i o n s  abo v e  i mp l y  th a t  p ' • p* b e c a u s e  t h e y  h o l d
t h a t  b i d d ers c a n  r e c o g n i z e  m i sman a g e d  f i rms a t  a n  a c c e p t ab l e  
c o s t .  T h u s , a l l  p art i c i p a n t s  i n  an a u c t i o n  w i l l  k n o w  p *  a n d  t h e  
a u c t i o n  pr i c e  mus t t h e n  e q u a l  p *  i n  e q u i l i br i um ; i n  f i n a n c i a l  
mark e t s , a l l  a c q u i s i t i o n s  h a v e  z ero n e t  pres e n t  v a l u e  i f  
i n forma t i o n  i s  p er f e c t . 17 T h ere f ore , ( 4 )  > ( 5 ) ; t h e  n e t  e x p e c t e d
g a i n  t o  s e arch i s  un ambi g u o u s l y  h i g h e r  u n d e r  a n o  a u c t i o n  ru l e . 
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  a u c t i o n  ru l e  re d u c e s  x t h e  probabi l i t y t h a t  
a n o nm a x lmlz ln g f irm w i l l  b e  ro u n d ; t h i s  ls c o n t rary t o  t h e  
p o l i c y  r e comme n d a t i o n  abo v e . W e  t h ere fore h a ve a more pre c i s e 
p o l i c y  r e comme n d a t i o n : i f  t h e  o bj e c t  i s  t o  i n c re a s e  t h e  
l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  mana g ers w i l l  ma x i m i z e ,  t h e  s t a t e  s h o u l d  pro h i bi t 
a uc t i o n s . 
T h o u g h t h e  f o c u s  here i s  o n  a u c t i o n s , t h e  a n a l y s i s  a l so 
prov i d e s  a n o t her r e a s o n  t o  q u e s t i o n  t h e  l e ga l i t y  o f  d e f e n s i v e 
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t a c t i c s . Con s i d er e q u a t i o n  ( 4 )  a n d  s u p p o s e  t h a t a u c t i o n s  are n o t  
a l l o w e d  bu t d e f e n s i v e t a c t i c s  are . T h e n ,  t h e  f i rs t  t erm i n  ( 4 )  
mu s t  be m u l t i p l i e d  by � < 1 . Th i s  i s  b e c a u s e  t h e  a b i l i t y o f
targ e t  ma n a g ers t o  u s e  d e f e n s i v e  t a c t i c s  re d u c e s  t o  be l o w  o n e  t h e  
probab i l i t y t h a t  t h e  f i rs t s e arc h e r  t o  f i n d  a m i sma n a g e d  targe t 
w i l l buy i t .  H e n c e ,  d e f e n s i v e  t a c t i c s  a l s o  re d u c e  t h e  e x p e c t e d  
g a i n  t o  s e arc h . T h e s e  t a c t i c s  t h u s  s h o u l d·be d i s a l l o w e d  u n l e s s  
t h e y  h a v e  p o s i t i v e  f e a t u re s . T h a t i s s u e  i s  be y on d  t h i s  p a p er ' s  
s c o p e , e x c e p t  t o  s a y  t h a t  s u c h  f e a t ure s are n o t  re a d i l y a p p are n t . 
Some a n a l y s t s  a s k  e x p l i c i t l y  abo u t  t h e  w e l fare o f  t arg e t  
s h are h o l d ers . T h i s  i n q u i r y  may s e e m  u n n e c e s s ary g i v e n  t h e  
a s s ump t i o n  a bo v e  t h a t ,  i f  a l l  ma n a g ers ma x i m i z e , s o c i a l  w e a l t h  i s  
gre a t er t h a n  i f  some or many d o  n o t . T h e  s t a t e ' s  o n l y  g o a l  t h e n  
a p p are n t l y  s h o u l d  b e  t o  promo t e  t h e  c om i n g  i n t o  e x i s t e n c e ,  o r  t o  
e n s ure t h e  c o n t i n u an c e ,  o f  ma x i m i z i n g  e q u i l i br i a ,  u n l e s s  i t  
s h o u l d  prefer t h e  i n t ere s t s  o f  th o s e  a d v a n t a g e d  by a re d u c e d  
l i k e l i h o o d  o f  ma x i m i z i n g e q u i l i br i a  t o  t h e  w e l f are o f  s o c i e t y .  
T h i s  pre f e re n c e  c a n n o t  b e  j u s t i f i e d  o n  u t i l i t ar i a n  gro un d s . 
W i t h o u t an a u c t i o n ,  t h e  a c q u i rer's s h are h o l d ers k e e p  t h e  e n t i re 
g a i n  p* - ( L  + 0 ) ; w i th o n e , th e g a i n  g o e s  to t h e  t arge t ' s
s h are h o l d ers . T h ere i s  n o  re a s o n  t o  s u p p o s e  t h a t  u t i l i t y w i l l  be 
gre a t e r  o n e  w a y  or t h e  o t h er. I n d e e d ,  g i v e n  t h a t p ers o n s  o f t e n  
h o l d  d i v ers i f i e d  port f o l i o s ,  t h e  t w o  s h are h o l d e r  gro u p s  a c t u a l l y  
c o u l d  o v erl a p . T h e  o n l y  o t her gro u p  d i s a d v a n t a g e d  by a 
proh i b i t i o n  o f  a u c t i o ns are t h e  ma n a g ers w h o  w i l l  n o t  max i m i z e , 
for t h e  proh i b i t i o n  i n c re a s e s  t h e  r i s k s  t o  t h e m  o f  p urs u i n g t h a t 
s tr a t e g y ;  bu t t h ere i s  no re a s o n  to c o u n t  t h e  m a n a g ers ' i n t ere s t s  
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b e ca u s e  �hey are act i n g impro p erl y . S i nce no a c t or i n  t h i s  world 
d e s erve s a d i s tr i b u t i o n a l  pre fere n c e , a u t i l i t ar i a n a n a l y s i s  
i mp l i e s  t h a t t h e  s t a t e  s h o u l d  a t�emp t o n l y  t o  ma k e  t h e  s o c i a l  p i e 
a s  l arge as p o s s i b l e . To do th i s  i s  to proh i b i t  a uc t i o n s . We 
sh a l l  l a t e r  a s k  w h e t h er t arg e t  s h are h o l d ers h a v e  a pro p er t y  r i g h t  
t h a t  t h i s  proh i b i t i o n  w o u l d  i n fr i n g e , b u t  for n o w  a l i t t l e more 
ca n be s a i d  a b o u t t h e  e co n om i c s . 
T h e  mo d e l  s e e m i n g l y  pre d i c t s  t w o  e q u i l i br i a , o n e  i n  wh i ch 
a l l  f i rms max i m i z e  a n d  o n e  i n  wh i ch n o n e  d o ; f or w h e n  x i s  t o o
l o w  t o  i n d uce ma x i m i z i n g  e ach ma n a g er w i l l  f i n d  i t  o p t i ma l  n o t  t o  
max i m i z e . I t  may b e ,  t ho u g h ,  t h a t  a d i s tr i b u t i o n  o f  max i m i z i n g 
a n d  n o nma x im i z i n g  f irms co u l d  e x i s t  b eca u s e  o f  t h e  mo d e l ' s  o t h e r  
p arame t ers . For e x amp l e ,  i f  d i sco u n t  ra t e s  w ere to d i f f er acro s s  
ma n a g ers , t h e  s a me amo u n t  o f  s e arch co u l d  ca u s e  some t o  ma x i m i z e  
b u t  n o t  o t hers . A l s o ,  i f  r i s k  a v ers i o n  d i f f ers a cro s s  m a n a gers , 
a g a i n  t h e  same amo un t  o f  s earch co u l d  ca u s e  s ome o f  t h e m  t o  
ma x i m i z e  b u t  n o t  o t h ers . F i n a l l y , t h e  mo d e l  s u p p o s e d  a l l  
ma n a gers t o  b e  comp e t e n t ; t h e y  a l w a y s  co u l d  ca u s e  t h e ir f irm ' s  
s h are v a l u e s  t o  e q u a l  p * . Some man a gers may b e  i ncap ab l e  o f  
ma x i m i z i n g , h ow e v er, s o  t h a t e v e n  w er e  x l arg e e n o u g h  t o  i n d uc e
ma x i m i z i n g , a f e w  f irm s co u l d  s e l l  a t  p < p * .  H e nc e , i t  i s
p o s s i b l e  for a d i s tr i b u t i o n  t o  e x i s t  i n  e q u i l i vr i u m ,  i n  w h i c h  
some f irms ma x i m i z e  b u t  o t hers do n o t ; t h i s  i d e a  d e s erv e s  more 
co n s i d era t i o n  t h a n  i t  rece i ve s  ab o v e . 
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  w h ich no f irms ma x i m i z e  s e ems 
l e s s  s t ab l e  t h a n  o n e  in wh i ch a l l  f i rms d o . I f  n o  f i rms 
ma x i m i z e ,  t he t r u e  pro b a b i l i t y of a s e arch er dra w i n g  a 
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n o n ma x im i z i n g  f i rm g o e s  t o  o n e . S i nc e  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  
pro b a b i l i t y ,  8, t h a t  s e arch ers a s s i g n  t o  f i n d i n g s uch a f i rm i s  
a s s u m e d  t o  b e  p art l y  a f u nc t i o n  o f  t h e  tru e  d i s t r i b u t i o n, w h e n  
s e arch a l ways prod uce s g a i n s ,  the p erce i v e d  e x p ec t e d  g a i n  to 
s e arch s h o u l d  a l s o  r i s e  a n d  more s e arch w i l l  be i n d u ce d .  T h i s  
co u l d  dr i v e x h i g h  e n o u g h  t o  i n d uce max i m i z i n g m a n a ger
b e h a v i o r .  On the o t h er h a n d ,  w ere a l l  f irm s t o  m a x i m i z e ,  t h e  
e x i s t e nce o f  a t  l e a s t  s o me f i rms w h o  are a l w a y s  s e arch i ng t h e  
s y n erg y a n d  ca s u a l  s earch ers - - c o u l d  k e e p  x h i g h  e n o u g h  t o
e n s ure t h e  ma i n t e n a nce o f  a m a x i m i z i n g  e q u i l i br i u m .  T h a t  some 
f i rms a l w a y s  d o  s e arch a l s o  s e e ms co n�1s t e n t  w i t h the e v i d e nce . 
T h e  mo d e l  i s  far from i d e a l , howe v e r ,  b e ca u s e  i t  i s  
d i f f i cu l t  t o  a p p l y  t o  a c t u a l  mark e t s . T o  s e e  w h y , w e  can s o lve 
e q u a t i o n  ( 3 )  for X , the pro b a b i l i t y t h a t a n o n ma x i m i z i n g  f irm 
w i l l  b e  d i scov ered. T h i s  g i v e s  
( 6 )  M a x  i f  f x > 
T h e n ,  i f s a.$120,000, s *  • $100,000, a n ds 
ma x i m i z e  i f  h e  t h i n k s  t h a t  x e x ce e d s  .285. 
• $50,000, a 
A 1 
Us i n g  x • N
ma n a g e r  w i l l  
n A 2 + N- , a n
a n a l y s t  co u l d  a s k  wh e th er t h ere i s  e n o u g h  s e arch i n  t h e  re l e v a n t  mark e' 
-- is x > .285? - t o  e n s u re max i m i z i n g b e h a v i or .  S uch a t es t
w o u l d  b e  h ard t o  co n d uc t . I n  part i c u l a r ,  g i v e n t h a t  f irms a n d  
m a n a g ers c a n  v ary w i d e l y ,  f i n d i n g v a l u e s  f o r  s , s *  a n d  8 t h a t
h a v e  g e n era l i t y w o u l d  b e  q u i t e  d i f f i c u l t . A l s o , e q u a t i o n  (3 ) ,  
from wh i c h  ( 6 )  i s  d e r i v e d , i s  i t s e l f  a s i mp l i f i ca t i o n  b e ca u s e  i t  
i g nores ma n a ger d i sc o u n t  ra t e s . T h e  correct e x p r e s s i o n  
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for x i n c l u d e s  t h e m  bu t t h e y  c a n n o t  be obs erv e d  d ir e c t l y .
M a n a g ers c o u l d  p l a u s i b l y  be s u p p o s e d t o  u s e  mark e t  ra t e s , 
c orre c t e d  for t h e  h i g h e s t  marg i n a l  t a x  bra c k e t ,  bu t a g a i n  a n  
emp ir i c a l  t e s t w o u l d  y i e l d i n e x a c t  re s u l t s . 18
T h e refore , the mo d e l  is u s e fu l  p r i mar i l y  to d er i v e 
q u a l i t a t i v e  c o n c l u s i o n s . For e x a mp l e , t he s t a t e  s h o u l d  e l i m i n a t e  
t a x  d e d u c t i o ns for c orp ora t e  h u n t i n g l o d g e s  - - re d u c e  s re l a t i ve 
to s* -- a n d  fa c i l i t a t e  s earch - - i n crea s e  x u n l e s s  g o o d
re a s o n s  e x i s t  no t t o  d o  t h e s e  t h i n g s .  P art s II a n d  I I I  be lo w 
co n s i der whe t h er g o o d  re a s o n s  e x i s t  to be l e s s  c o n c er n e d  w i t h 
s earch t h a n  t h e  mo d e l  s u g g e s t s ;  P art I n e x t  c o n s i d ers t h e  
a s sump t i o n s t h a t  u n d erl i e  a n d  s o me obj e c t i o ns t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of 
IA .
B .  T h e  U n d erl y i n g A s s u mp t i o n s  
M a n y  o f  t h e  mo d e l's a s s u mp t i o n s  ha v e  be e n  d i s c u s s e d  bu t 
three d e s erve fur ther me n t i o n , t h a t  s e arc h ers c a n  re c o g n i z e  
m i s ma n a g e d  f irms , t h a t ma n a gers are i n t er e s t e d  o n l y  i n  p ers o n a l  
ga i n  a n d  t h a t  t h e  e ff i c i e n t  mark e t  h y p o t h e s i s  i s  v a l i d .  T h e  
firs t t w o  are c o n s i d er e d  here, t h e  t h ird i n  P art I C . T h e  f i rs t 
a s sump t i o n  i s  imp ort a n t  to t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  mark e t  for 
corp ora t e  c o n t ro l  c a n  e x ert a n o n t ri v i a l  c o n s tra i n t  on ma n a g e r i a l  
be h a v i or a n d  i t  i mp l i e s  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  a u c t i o n s  w i l l forc e 
targ e t  s h are pri c e s  to t h e  ma x i m i z i n g  l e v e l ,  a n d  so n e c e s s a r i l y  
re d u c e  t h e  e x p e c t e d  re turns t o  s e arch . T h a t  m i s ma n a g e d  f i rms are 
s e arch g o o d s  s e ems p l a u s i bl e  s i n c e  t h e  s e arch ers oft e n  are 
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profe s s i o n a l s ,  a n d  a u d i t e d  f i n a n c i a l s  t o g e t h e r  w i t h a k n o w l e d g e  
of t h e  t a rge t ' s  i n d u s try s h o u l d  re v e a l  m i sma n a ge me n t  to e x p e rts 
w ho look d i re c t l y for i t .  A l s o , t h e  t w o  obv i o u s wa y s  t o  re l a x  
t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  f i rms are s e arch g o o d s  d o  n o t  i mp l y  d i ffere n t  
p o l i c y  c o n c l u s i o n s  t h a n  t h o s e drawn abov e .  F i rs t ,  f i rms i n  A 
c o u l d  be p a rt i t i o n e d  i n  a th i rd way : l e t  t h ere be t wo t y p e s ,  
t h o s e t h a t e v a l u a t e  o t h e r  f irms a t  h i g h  c o s t  a n d  t h o s e  t h a t 
e v a l u a t e  o t her f i rms a t  l o w  c o s t. T h e  d i s t i nc t i o n  corr e s p o n d s  to 
e x p ert i s e  and s c a l e  e c o n o m i e s ; firms w i th a c q u i s i t i o n  pro g rams 
m i g h t  be able to e v a l u a t e  at low c o s t  wh i l e c a s u a l  s e arc h ers 
m i g h t  n o t .  T h e n  l e t  f i rm s  i n  N be of t w o  t y p e s , f irms t h a t c a n  
be e v a l u a t e d  a t  l o w  c o s t  a n d  f i rms t h a t  c a n be e v a l u a t e d a t  h i g h  
c o s t ,  where t h e  ma n a g e rs k n o w  wh a t  t y p e  o f  f i rm t h e y  are i n bu t 
c a n n o t  i n f l u e n c e  t h e ir t y p e . L e t  f i rms i n  A1 , who t a k e  o n e  dra w ,
be h i g h  c o s t  e v a l u a t ors a n d  f irms i n  A 2 be l o w  c o s t  e va l u a t ors . 
T h e n  n o th i n g c h a n g e s  for f i rms t h a t  are e a s y  to e v a l u a t e ; whe t h e r  
t h e y  a r e  v i s i t e d  b y  members of A1 o r  A 2 , t he i r true t y p e  w i l l  b e
r e v e a l e d . B u t  t h e  probab i l i t y t h a t  a f i rm t h a t  i s  c o s t l y t o  
e va l u a t e w i l l  b e  bo u g h t  d e c l i n e s  from 
for a c a s u a l  s ea r c h e r  w i l l  n o t  k n ow s u c h  a f i rm ' s  t ru e  t y p e  a n d  
t h u s  w i l l  n o t  b i d  for i t .  If n i s  sma l l  or A 2 i s  sma l l  re l a t i v e 
to A1 , an e q u i l i br i um c o u l d  t h e n  e x i s t  i n  wh i c h  t h e  e a s y  t o
e v a l u a t e  f i rms ma x i m i z e  bu t t h e  h ard t o  e v a l u a t e  f i rms d o  no t .  
Th i s  o u t c ome i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  r e a c h e d  abo v e  
be c a u s e  i t  i mp l i e s  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  s h o u l d  i n cre a s e  s e arch by 
profe s s i o n a l s , w h o  are t h e  l o w  c o s t  e v a l u a t ors . B e c a u s e  
profe s s i o n a l s  are re l a t i v e l y  r e s p o n s i v e t o  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  
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expected returns to search, if this variant of the model is a 
plausible description of the world, it ls then even less wise to 
permit auctions. 
A second way to relax the assumption that targets are search 
goods ls to suppose that searchers cannot know with certainty 
whether targets are maximizing or not but the searchers can 
construct probability distributions over target returns. Such a 
distribution, for a typical firm in a target's industry, may look 








If a searcher, after constructing the distribution, observes a 
potential target that earns $1 ,000,000 a year or more, the 
searcher would not bid; $1 ,000,000 ls the most likely maximizing 
return for a firm in the target's class, and returns in excess of 
this would be highly inconsistent with suboptimal manager 
behavior. But the searcher would bid if it observed a return of 
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$500,000 because this return is unlikely to be earned by a 
maximizing firm. If searchers' expectations are unbiased in the 
aggregate -- just as many overestimate the likelihood of 
maximizing behavior from a given data set. as understimate it --
the analysis above is unaffected: unbiased expectations imply 
that searchers on average bid when they should, which the model 
above supposed was the case, Also, the pressure on managers to 
maximize would be reduced below the appropriate level only if 
searchers were systematically pessimistic. To see why, suppose 
that Figure I reflects the true state of the world. A 
pessimistic searcher might substitute $500,000 for $1 ,000,000 in 
the Figure, and not bid for a target that had returns of $500,000 
or more. No reason exists to believe that searchers are 
systematically pessimistic in this way . If guesses are 
permitted, optimism is the more likely searcher error, for 
searchers earn income by buying targets, not by passing targets 
up. Therefore, letting searchers have only probability 
distributions over target returns is unlikely to affect the 
conclusions just reached. 
A formal analysis treating targets as experience goods in a 
search context could of course yield different conclusions, but 
that analysis is beyond the state of the art. 19 Also, the one 
formal treatment of targets as experience goods suggested a 
passive role for target managers, though it failed to incorporate 
acquirer search.20 Thus, treating firms as search goods ls 
justifiable for policy purposes. 
The model also supposed managers to be self aggrandizing 
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whenever agency costs were too high to compel them to max1mize. 
Many managers, however, may do the best for their companies that 
the circumstances permit, though suboptimal behavior will not be 
punished, just because they want to do the right thing. Also, 
corporations, it is claimed, sometimes reduce the negative 
affects of self regarding behavior by socialization processes 
that promote a team spirit.21 That managers adhere to or can be 
socialized into norms of right conduct is consistent with the 
analysis above. If compliance with these norms is perfect, there 
will be no takeovers in the world of the model, for then the 
managers always maximize. To the extent that managers fall 
short, takeovers can play a useful role . 
c. Auction Proponents and Search 
Auction proponents make two arguments respecting search, 
that it is for undervalued rather than mismana�ed companies and 
so is socially wasteful and that a searcher's ability to sell its 
shares in the target to the successful bidder implies that 
auctions do not necessarily reduce the extent of search.22 
Neither argument is tenable . The former takes the following 
form: (i) target managers attempt to maximize share values; (ii) 
they do maximize the wealth that their firms' assets can yield; 
(iii) the market mistakenly believes that some targets' assets 
are generating less wealth than is actually the case or will 
generate less wealth in the future than they in fact can; (iv) in 
consequence of (iii), the price of these tirgets' shares is lower 
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than the true value of the firm justifies, so that any acquirer 
which learned the facts about such a firm would bid for it. The 
second premise implies that the costs associated with takeovers 
- - search for undervalued firms, bidding expenses - - are a 
deadweight loss because no acquirer could produce more social 
wealth than a target's managers could . Therefore, depressing 
these takeover costs is desirable, which implies that the search 
reducing aspect of auctions also is desirable. The key premises 
are (iii) and (iv). To see why, let the market's estimate of 
future profits, embodied in current share prices, always be the 
best the facts permit. A potential ac�uirer nevertheless may 
believe that the market's estimate r•garding a particular target 
is too low. A takeover bid motivated by this aberrational belief 
would not be wasteful in the sense at issue here; private 
economies rest largely on the premise that being willing to back 
aberrational beliefs with money yields economic progress. 
Rather, the undervaluation argument holds that !!!!.1. potential 
acquirer which learns the "truth" about a given target will bid 
because the market's estimate -- the aggregate beliefs of traders 
is wrong. 
The model developed in Part!A analyzed search only for 
mismanaged companies becaus� it supposed the semi -strong form of 
the efficient market hypothesis to hold. When it does, there 
seldom would be undervalued companies; the market's estimate 
generally is the most accurate one the facts permit. Hence, in 
the model's world searchers bid only for mismanaged targets or 
for those as to which they hold.aberrational beliefs. 
-25-
overwhelming evidence exists to support the semi-strong form of 
the efficient market hypothesis.23 Auction proponents must 
therefore show how their belief in the existence of undervalued 
targets is consistent with this evidence or refute it. 
task has been done convincingly. 
Neither 
Also, the undervaluation argument entails a contradiction or 
rests on an implausible premise. The first assumption, that 
target managers try to maximize share values, implies that the 
managers will inform the market whenever their firm is 
undervalued, and the second assumption, that the company is being 
run optimally, implies that the facts will support the managers' 
story. Therefore, auction proponents must add a fifth premise, 
which can take either of two forms: {v) (a): The market will not 
believe the managers; (v) (b) maximizing managers will not inform 
the market of the true state of the world. The first form the 
fifth premise can take contradicts the fourth, that searchers bid 
for undervalued targets. To see why, realize that a searcher 
bids on the basis of its analysis of the target; that is, the 
facts tell the searcher that the market price is lower than the 
best estimate of future profitability. But if these facts can 
convince particular searchers they can convince the market, which 
is composed of the full set of potential searchers. Thus to say 
that the market will not believe the managers is to contradict 
the premise t�at bids for undervalued companies will be made; if 
the market is unconvinced, actual searchers will be unc�nvinced 
as well.24 The second form the fifth premise can take yields an 
implausible story. Managers who want to maximize share values 
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will inform the market of the true facts unless to do so would 
injure their firms. This could occur if a firm· knew of rich 
mineral deposits and was about to acquire them or if a new 
product that could easily be copied was close to fruition, or the 
like; that is, maximizing managers would keep secrets until the 
proper time. A proponent of the undervaluation thesis must then 
explain how potential acquirers routinely learn these secrets 
though the market does not, and so routinely bid for 
(temporarily) undervalued firms. This seems difficult to do. 
And in sum the argument that auctions are desirable because they 
dampen search for undervalued targets is unpersuasive because it 
is inconsistent with the strongly validated e f ficient market 
hypothesis, and also is either incoherent or implausible. 
The second argument holds that auctions do not necessarily 
dampen search because firms sometimes can earn a greater return 
on assets invested in search when the auction option exists. 
This allegedly could occur when the first searcher to discover a 
mismanaged target takes a position in it secretly, then reveals 
its information and sells its position to the auction winner.25 
Since the case against auctions rests largely on their e ffect on 
search, that auctions may increase or have no effect on search 
vitiates the case. This second argument, however, is 
inconsistent with the premise that searchers maximize net 
expected returns. If maximizing behavior is assumed, it turns 
out that no searcher would prefer auctions because they always 
reduce returns to search. 
This conclusion is best illustrated by analyzing an example 
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that Professor Ronald Gilson constructed to support the view that 
auctions do not necessari�y reduce search intensity. 26 Gilson 
assumes that searchers do maximize profits, and supposes the case 
of a searcher that has spent $2,500,000 to locate a target with 
1 ,000,000 outstanding shares selling at $50; these shares would 
sell at $1 20 were the target managed correctly. The target could 
be bought for $1 00 a share in a tender offer. The searcher buys 
1 0% of the target at $50, the maximum it can purchase secretly. 
It then has two choices. It can tender for the target at $1 00 a 
share. The net return on assets invested will then be 23%, 
calculated as follows: the searcher owns a company worth 
$1 20,000,000 (a million shares at $1 20 a share) and it spent 
$97,500,000 ($2,500,000 on search, $5,000,000 for the first 1 0%, 
$90,000,000 for the rest). The searcher's second choice is to 
cause an auction to occur. Its return on assets invested in 
search is then 60%, calculated as follows: it earns $1 2,000,000 
on the sale or its shares (1 00,000 shares at $1 20) and it spent 
$7,500,000 ($2,500,000 on search and $5,000,000 for the 
shares). The example is meant to show that firms sometimes can 
earn greater returns with auctions than without them. 
Consequently, some rirms may specialize in f indlng targets and 
reselling them at auction rather than in taking targets over. No 
reason exists to believe, Gilson claims, that fewer takeovers 
will be attempted in this world than in a world without 
auctions. Since Gilson thinks that auctions have positive 
virtues -- they help move assets to their highest valued uses 
that their effect on search is ambiguous or positive defeats the 
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basic case against auctions. 
Gilson's example does not support this conclusion if 
searchers are assumed to maximize profits. Consider his first 
searcher after it has found the target and taken its initial 
position. The $7,500,000 spent on search and the purchase of 1 0% 
is then irrelevant, being a sunk cost; the question ls what the 
searcher should do next. It has two choices. First, it can 
cause an auction to occur and sell to the winner. This brings in 
$1 2,000,000. Second, it can pay $90,000,000 for 900,000 shares 
that will be worth $1 08,000,000 in its hands; purchasing the 
remaining 90% of the target at $1 00 and then owning shares worth 
$1 20 nets the searcher $1 8,000,000. Also, the searcher would 
still hold the original 1 00,000 shares, which would be worth 
$1 2,000,000. Thus, a searcher that facilitates an auction rather 
than buys the target ls throwing $1 8,000,000 away. No profit 
maximizing firm would do this. Hence, no such firm would prefer 
auctions. To return to Gilson's example, auctions cause the 
option of buying the target at $1 00 a share in a tender offer to 
vanish; the searcher's only choices are to sell the 1 0% at $1 20 
or buy the rest at $1 20, neither of which ls as profitable as 
buying the rest at $1 0o. 27 
Gllson's argument cannot be rescued by supposing that some 
firms specialize in search while others specialize in running 
companies. Were this so, the searchers in effect become agents 
for firms that would actually take over the targets; the 
searchers' reward is the fee the ultimate purchasers pay for the 
searchers' information. This fee will be higher without auctions 
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than with them because the principals do better when they can buy 
targets for less; consequently, their demand for the agents' 
services is greater in the no auction world. Thus, even if 
search for potential targets is a specialized activity, 
participants on the buying side of takeovers as a group do worse 
when auctions are permitted. Auctions therefore reduce the level 
of search.28 
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I I .  Auctions and the Highest Valued Uses of Targets 
Auction proponents claim that auctions help move target 
assets to their highest valued uses.29 This claim is outside the 
scope of the model Part IA set out. That model considered 
mismanaged firms: a mismanaged firm is equally valuable to all 
acquirers because any acquirer could maximize the firm's value 
and thereby earn p* less takeover costs, but could not earn 
more. The claim that auctions help move assets to their highest 
value use, in contrast, presupposes that potential acquirers 
value the same target assets differently. Hence, the claim 
applies only to synergy acquisitions, in which a target is more 
valuable when combined with .a limited set of firms than when 
operated independently or by companies outside the limited set. 
More precisely, the argument Part I I  analyzes holds: (i) the 
managers of a potential target are maximizing its share values; 
(ii) nevertheless, the target's value would increase were it 
combined with a particular firm or firms -- its "synergy 
partners"; (iii) the first synergy partner to find the target 
usually will put it to a lower value use than the target's other 
synergy partners would; (iv) auctions are necessary to move the 
target's assets to the highest valuing of these synergy partners 
because initial synergy partners -- the first bidders -- seldom 
will resell targets to higher valuing users; (v) the state cannot 
distinguish, �ante, between synergy acquisitions and others, so 
it must have one rule for all: auctions vel .!12.!l ; (vi) the 
efficiency gains from achiev�ng the highest valued synergy 
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acquisitions outweigh whatever efficiency losses flow from the 
auction institution. Therefore, the state should permit 
auctions. 
The third and fourth assumptions are crucial. To see why, 
let the first synergy partner to find a target also be the 
highest valuing user; merger with it would generate $10,000,000 
in synergy gains. This partner would want to minimize the 
fraction of these gains going to target shareholders, and so may 
include only a $2, 000,000 synergy premium in its takeover bid. 
second firm, suppose, could generate $8,000,000 in synergy gains 
from merger with the target . Were an auction held, this second 
firm would overbid, so that the first synergy partner could not 
acquire the target without including at least an $8,000,000 
synergy premium in its offer. The auction, however, would not 
transfer target assets to their highest valuing user, but rather 
would only redistribute wealth from acquirer to target 
shareholders; they gain $6,000,000 from the auction . An 
efficiency claim for auctions thus must presuppose first bidding 
synergy partners routinely to value targets less highly than 
other synergy partners,, and suppose also that first synergy 
partners routinely refuse to resell to later ones. Neither 
assumption is plausible . 
To consider the first, some pictures might be useful. The 
horizontal axis plots types of use to which a particular target 
could be put, the vertical axis the expected synergy value of a 
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An auction proponent must believe that Figure I I  best describes 
the acquisition world, and that original bidders commonly use 
targets to make widgets, the lowest value use to which targets 
can be put. The first premise is strong. Companies ordinarily 
possess much firm specific physical capital and have specialized 
management teams. That physical and human capital ordinarily are 
specialized to targets implies the unlikelihood of using a 
particular target to generate synergy gains in a wide variety of 
uses. Put concretely, a potential acquirer that manufactures 
lawn mowers perhaps could combine synergistically with a 
potential target that manufactures farm equipment but not with a 
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target that makes drugs. Also, potential acquirers with similar 
plans for the target would earn similar returns from its 
puryhase. The world, that is, looks more like Figure III than 
Figure II. As Figure III shows, even were first bidders 
routinely interested in widgets, auctions would not generate 
significant efficiency gains. 
First bidders also seldom would care about widgets. The 
model in Part IA, though not formally applicable to synergy 
acquisitions, did show that search intensity generally is partly 
a function of the expected gains to search. The greater are the 
synergy gains from a particular type of recombination, the 
greater the gains to search for it. Hence, were the world to 
look like Figure I I, more search would be conducted by potential 
acqulrers interested in using targets to produce computers or sex 
aids than to produce widgets, unless "widget searchers " have 
significantly lower search costs. As no reason exists to believe 
this is so, widget searchers are unlikely to be the first 
bidders. If they are not, again no significant efficiency gains 
flow from auctions. 
When a first bidder is not the highest valuing user, it 
could earn positive profits by reselling to this user but auction 
proponents claim �hat these resales will not be made. This ls 
because the managers of first bidders are said to maximize size 
rather than profits, and obviously run larger concerns when 
keeping the target than when reselling it.3 0  It is difficult to 
take this claim seriously.3 1 No one who makes it has precisely 
put the view that firms maximize size or shown how a preference 
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for size is consistent with the existence of acquirers that value 
targets differently. Trying to do these things makes the size 
claim false positively, or both implausible and false 
normatively. 
The size claim is false in fact because successful first 
bidders will resell in a world where all firms maximize size. To 
see why suppose that to maximize size is to maximize revenue 
rather than profits; a size maximizing firm, that is, increases 
output until price equals average rather than marginal cost. A 
target could be valued differently by a subset of such firms 
� . synergy could exist - - if the target would generate 
different revenue streams with different merger partners. For 
example, $5, 000,000 a year in revenue would be generated were T 
to merge with B1 , $8, 000, 000 with B2, $1 0, 000, 000 with s3 . Then, 
if B1 were a successful first bidder, it would resell to s3 • 
This is because B3 could make a cash payment to B1 such that B1 
could earn at least $5 ,000, 000 a year at the market interest 
rate, and s3 would still be better off than had it not made the 
payment . The logic of this result applies to any maximand that 
B1 and B3 have in common, such as profits or sales: when B1 and 
B3 maximize the same thing and B1 can get less of it from merger 
with the target than s3 can, there exists a mutually attractive 
deal whereby B1 would resell to s3 . 
An auction proponent could rescue from falsity his claim 
that first bidders will not resell by assuming that first and 
later bidders have different maximands but this assumption also 
causes fatal difficulties. Let first bidders maximize revenue 
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Wh i le later bi dders max i m i ze profits .  Then the prof i ts that 
merger w i th a part i cular target would y i eld a later b i dder m i ght 
be insuff i c i ent to support a buyout of a revenue max i m i z i ng f i rst 
b i dder. Even so, the no resale cla i m  i s  unpursuas i ve. F' i rs t, 
the cla i m  is h i ghly i mplaus i ble . Why are f i rst b i dders rout i nely 
s i ze max i m i zers whi le second b i dders are rout i nely prof it maxi -
m i zers? Second, the cla i m  lacks general i ty. S o meti mes a pro f i t  
max i m i z i ng second b i dder could buy out a s i ze maxi m i z i n g  f irst 
b i dder and somet i mes not. There seems no way to pred i ct the most 
l i kely outcome. Th i rd, the cla i m  is normat i vely false. If all 
b i dders maxi m i ze prof i ts, ut i l i ty i s  max i m i zed when assets move 
to the i r  h i ghest valued uses . When a f i rst b i dder max i m i zes 
revenue and a later b i dder max i m i zes pro f i ts, and the later b i d ­
der could not make the payment necessary to i nduce the f i rst b i dder 
to resell, th i s  must be because the f i rst b i dder der i ves more 
ut i l i ty fro m usi ng the target assets i n  the way i t  wants than the 
later b i dder would der i ve from usi ng those asse�s to sat i sfy i ts 
preference. Hence, ut i l i ty is maxi m i zed when no resale is made. 
Thus an auct i o n  proponent who assumes f i rst and later b i dders to 
have d i fferent maxi mands must just i fy h i s  proauct i on pos i t i on o n  
nonut i l i tarian gro unds. T h i s  has not been done . 
To summar i ze, the cla i m  that auct i ons m o ve assets to the i r  
h i ghest v�lued uses can apply only t o  synerg y  acqu i s i t i o ns but 
fa i ls as to them . Th i s  is because f i rst b i dders in a no auct i o n  
world often w i ll be i n  the set of h i g hest valu i ng users, and i f  not 
would resell to h i gher valu i ng later b i dders. Parts I and I I  
together sug gest that n o  eff i c i ency defense of auct i o ns exi sts . 
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Rather, aucti o ns reduce welfare. Part IA also argued that no 
d i str i but i onal case can be made for auct i o ns. Hence, they should 
be altogether proh i b i ted unless to do so wo uld abr i dge the r i ghts 
of target f irm shareholders. Part I I I cons iders th is issue. 
I I I . Auct i ons and Property R i ghts 
A subtext to the l i terature on Corporate F' i nance holds that 
shareho lders have a r i ght to part of the wealth that corporate 
reco mb i nat i ons create. The assumed ex i stence of th i s  r i g ht 
underl ies the proh i b i t i on of the sale 0f corporate o ff i ce, 
re gulat i o n  of the sale o f  control a n d  fa irness revi ew o f  two step 
mergera. 3 2 Luc i en Bebchuk co mes clo sest to art i culat i ng the 
r i ghts thes i s  i n  the tender o ffer context: the state sho uld 
ensure, he argues, "a le gal fra mework that is i ntended to enable 
the d i spersed shareholders of a potent i al seller to funct i o n as a 
sole owner would. " 3 3  A sole owner of a target would acqu i re a 
larger port i o n  of the wealth from a tender o ffer than " d i spersed 
[ target] shareholders " could because coord inat i on co a ts prevent 
the shareholders from barg a i n i n g effect ively . Auct i ons 
amel i orate th i s  problem because the co mpet i t i ve b i dd i ng process 
perm i ts the shareholders to ri hold out" for the beat offer, not be 
compelled to take the f i rst one. Consequently, auct i o ns are 
des irable . Th i s  argument needs a further pre m i se because so c i ety 
cons iders the decentral i zed ownersh ip i nherent i n  the corporate 
form to be benef ic ial. Why sho uld it create a legal re g i me that 
m i m ics the s i ng le owner model? The further prem i se is that 
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target shareholders have a property right to a portion of the 
gains from a tender offer; thus, the state shou ld create a legal 
structure that in effect gives shareholders the same bargaining 
power as so le owners have when they receive offers for their 
property. This Part argues that no such right exists. 
A. Substantive Sources of Rights 
There are four substantive sources of rights to consider, 
those that may flow from contract, extracontractua l expectations, 
notions of fairness and theories of property. Respecting 
contract, shareho l ders may facilita ;e auctions, in a wor ld where 
the state otherwise fails to provide for them, by a ltering the 
corporate structure. For examp le, potentia l targets may give 
their shareholders • poison pil ls.• A poison pi l l  is a dividend 
of convertib le preferred target stock that would be automatica l ly 
convertible into the voting stock of an acquirer after merger, at 
a favorab le price. Poison pi l ls thus di lute the value of the 
acquirer's shares and thereby reduce the profitabil ity of a 
takeover for the acquirer's shareho l ders. One strategy that 
acquirers can adopt when raced with a poison pil l  is to bid on ly 
if the target waives the convertability rights that the pil l  
confers. The time requisite to negotiating over waiver, however, 
may permit target management to locate other bidders . Hence, 
target shareholders conceivab ly could obtain • auction prices• 
through contracting inter �· Whether share contracts that 
permit this strategy are enforceab le is controversial and 
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remarked on briefly below. In the absence of such antitakover 
c l auses, no ' contract right to auctions exists. · 
E xtracontractua l  ex pectations cannot support a right in 
target sharehol ders to tender offer gains . As a matter of fact, 
these shareholders expect potentia l acquirers to bid as litt le as 
possible. Shareho lders a l so expect their own officers to do as 
wel l for them as the law permits. The question, though, is 
whether the law should permit auctions. Shareho l ders may a lso 
expect "the system• to ensure them something like auction prices 
but such broad expectations are · protected on ly if they are 
• reasonab l e "  or "legitimate.• What .is reasonab le or l e gitimate 
is determined by the princip les or po l icies the state wants to 
pursue. Neither economic efficiency nor justice as fair 
distribution3 4  imply that auctions are desirab le. Hence, it is 
• unreasonab le " or "il legitimate • of shareholders to expect the 
system to produce auctions or their equiva lents un l ess the 
shareholders have a right to them. But that is the point at 
issue . Hence, extracontractua l expectations cannot a lone support 
a right to auctions. 
Genera l  notions of fairness imp ly that shareholders should 
be trea�ed equa l l y .  A prohibition of auctions may yie ld unequal 
treatment, but as with a l l  equality claims an underlying norm 
For must be �resupposed ; the difficu lty is · to identify the norm. 
example, let a l l  shareholders in a no auction wor ld have the 
opportunity to offer their shares at a price of L + 0 but some do 
not; later, the nontendering shareho lders are frozen out at L .
A l l  shareholders had equa l ity of opportunity but the latter group 
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do not have equality of result. Is equality of result 
required? Or suppose that a potential acquirer does not want to 
buy a l l  the target's shares and leaves its offer open on ly f�r 
five da y s .  Shareho l ders who are sophisticated or who. live near 
the acquirer have a greater chance to tender. Does this deny 
equality of opportunity to the rest? They could have educated 
themselves or had professionals manage their affairs or lived in 
New York. 35 Substantive and procedural equality claims, that is, 
are parasitic on values but the question is what are the 
va lues. Part I I IA next considers property rights theories a s  
value sources; Part I I I B  considers " procedural" sources. 
Property theory recognizes four sources of rights, Lockean, 
utilitarian, personhood or social welfare claims and 
1 i b er tar i an i s.m • None support a property right in target 
shareholders to the gains that takeovers create. A Lockean 
property rights claim in a person and to a thing arises in virtue 
of the person participating in the creation of the thing. Target 
shareholders buy equity but participate in creating nothing; in 
particular, they do not participate in creating value from a 
tender offer: this is done by the acquirer. Utilitarianism 
a ssigns property rights to maximize utility . As Parts I and II 
above have shown, prohibiting auctions maximizes welfare; this 
implies that a property right which would support a claim to 
auctions cannot be derived from utilitarian premises. The 
implication could be overcome if one could plausibly show that 
target shareholders would derive more utility from the additional 
dollars an auction would give them than acquirer shareholders 
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would derive from these same dollars. This showing cannot be 
made because both sets of shareholders are likely to be in the 
same socia l c lasses and may even overlap; and no other reason 
exists to be l ieve that target sharehol ders in genera l lose more 
welfare than acquirer shareholders gain. Theories of personhood 
provide that people may have property rights to things, such as 
homes or wedding rings, in which their personalities have been 
invested, in some meaningful sense of "invest. "36 Stock 
certificates, however, are the paradigm of property that is 
fungible rather than personal. Welfare rights theories hold that 
persons must possess that minimum level of goods and services 
necessary to enable them to lead meaningful, autonomous 
lives . 37 It is difficult to argue that the wealth a no auction 
world takes away from target shareholders (p* - (L + 0 )  at most) 
is necessary to them in this sense, or rather more necessary to 
them in this way than it is to acquirer shareholders. Finally, 
libertarian property rights claims are largely parasitic on 
Lockean ones; when they are not (also when they are), they 
provide that one's property must be protected . This begs the 
question, which is to decide what is one ' s  property. 
In sum, target shareholders have no substantive right to a 
portion of the gains that takeovers create. Such a right usually 
cannot be derived from contract. Whether target shareholders 
have a legitimate expectation of participating in takeover gains 
or deserve equality of result regarding these gains must depend 
on whether they have a property right. No such right can be 
derived from any theory of the source of property rights that is 
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re garded as persuas i ve by anyone. If no r i ght to takeover gains 
exists, no r i ght to auct ions ex ists, unless not i ons o f  procedural 
f a irness req u i re them. 
B .  Procedural Values and Auctions 
A procedural claim wo uld hold that the means by wh ich 
corporate ownersh i p  are trans ferred must be fa ir to all a f fected 
persons and that auct ions are necessary to ensure fairness. 
Procedural valu es do not exist i n  isolation but must be der i ved 
from the substant ive g oals o f  the relevant soc i al 
i nstitution.3 8 Hence, the way to proceed is to ass i g n  g oals to 
the markets for shares and corporate control and then to ask 
whether a procedural right to auctions can be derived from 
them , One g oal for these markets is to create the largest amo unt 
o f  wealth for society at least cost. A second is to provide a 
means whereby people can real ize their good thro ugh the 
opportun i ty to compete, work and · create ; A third is to prov i de a 
way for people to save or invest personal wealth, and so reta i n  
and en hance the i r  ab i lity to live as free persons. None o f  these 
goals can support a procedural right to auctions. 
The f irst g oal, to maxim ize net soc ial wealth, is 
incons i stent with auctions. The second g oal applies more to 
corporate mana gers than to shareholders, for shareholders play 
largely pass ive roles. Some persons do derive personal 
satis faction from tradin g, but auctions seem u n necessary to the 
realization of sat i s faction in th i s  way. Not having auctions 
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shri nks by one the bundle of rig hts attached to share ownership 
but makes tradin g in shares no less mean ing f ul; in deed, the 
prohib i tion may make trad i n g  more mean i n g f ul, as an end one 
der i ves happ i n ess from pursu i n g, because it is more i mportant to 
be on the win nin g s ide. 
The th ird g oal, to provide a means to save and in vest, is a 
more likely candidate from which to derive a right to auct i ons, 
but the derivation ult i mately fa ils. Suppose persons are put in 
an "or i g inal position, " knowing neither the i r  f u ture endowme nts 
nor the i r  luck. Then, a maximin strate gy seem i n g ly impl ies a 
pre ference for auctions: i n  the worse �ase, one w i ll own only 
targets that are being r u n  not to ma•imize, an d one w i ll do 
better, when takeover b ids are made, if auct i o ns are held , Thls 
claim is amb i g uous, however, beca use aucti? ns reduce the 
likelihood that takeover b ids will be made and increase the 
l i kelihood that managers will f a i l  to max imize; that i s ,  auct i ons 
increase the likelihood that shareholders will be trapped in 
badly r u n  companies, Is the "true" worst case a world w i th 
auctions or one without them? More ser i ously, at what level o f  
abstraction is the worse case to be described? Thes e quest ions 
re flect the d i f ficulties o f  usin g or i g i nal posit ion analys is to 
just i f y  part icular rules rather than soc iety's bas i c  structure. 
Rawls himsel f beli eves the analysis should be used only for the 
latter purpos e , 3 9  Further, to suppose persons in the or i ginal 
pos i tion to use max i min is to suppose that people are extremely 
r isk averse ,  I f  less r i sk aversion is presumed, and i f  one has 
an equal chance to be any f u ture, real person, the n ,  as Harsanyi 
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poin ts out, the rat ional s tra tegy is to choose rules tha t  
maximize average utili ty. 40 Prohibi ting auc tions sat isfies this 
s tra tegy. Given how sig nifican t to people a socie ty's basic 
s t ructure is, a compromise s t rategy for persons in the original 
posi tion mig h t  be to play max imin for basic s tructure rules and 
play max imize average u t ili ty for t he res t .  This compromise, 
t oo, jus t ifies prohibiting auc tions. Hence, the goal of 
providing a means to save and inves t seems bes t  pursued in a no 
auction world. And in sum no procedural right in t arget 
shareholders to auct ions exis ts. 
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I V .  Conclusion 
The basic case against auc tions is correct when evalua ted in 
an imperfect informa t ion set ting. Auc tions reduce the re turns to 
search for mismanaged companies and thus reduce the likelihood 
that marke ts for corporate control and managerial services will 
cause corpora t e  managers to max imize share values. Auct ions also 
seemingly cannot move corpora te asse ts to t heir highes t valuing 
users more effectively than unregula ted markets do; consequen tly, 
t hey crea te no efficiency gains to s e t  agains t the likely 
efficiency losses flowing from reduced search. Finally, target 
shareholders are no t en t i t led to a dis tribu tional preference 
respec ting t akeover gains nor have they proper ty rights t o . those 
gains. Thus, there is no moral case for auc tions t hat could t ake 
precedence over the efficiency case agains t them. 
Targe t managers at tempt to reduce the likelihood of 
t akeovers by asking their shareholders t o  approve alterations in 
t he corpora te form. Pois on pills and shark repellent 
amendments41 are becoming common . An obvious nex t s tep is t o
consider t heir legali t y .  Though such changes i n  t h e  corpora te 
form reduce the likelihood of t akeovers, and so are ques t ionable 
for the reasons given above, t hey are adop ted by the 
shareholders; hence, t here is a norm of consen t to se t agains t 
t he possible efficiency cos ts of the claus es . This norm should 
not be regarded as conclusive because con tract law may supply 
reasons not to enforce an t i t akeover amendments. Con t rac ts 
some t imes are held subs tan t ively unconscionable if they adversely 
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a f fect third persons. When some firms adopt poison pills or 
shark repellent amendments, they reduce the pool o f  pro fitable 
acq uisitio ns that sear chers could make, and so r educe the gains 
to search over all firms . .  This could disadvantage the 
shareholde rs o f  firms who reject the alternative o f  altering the 
corporate form in favor of the discipline that markets can exert 
on man agers, and it also may be ine f f icient. The existence o f  
externalities traditionally reduces the likelihood that courts 
will regard party consent as insulating contracts from 
regulation. Consent also is problematic because possible 
procedural unconscionability objections to en forceme nt may 
exist. I f  the managers' failure to maximize is inside 
in formation, the consent o f  a target's shareholders to an 
antitakeover clause may not be fully in formed , �urther, the 
managers may propose antitakeover clauses to help ensure job 
security. Were a corporate structure contain ing antitakeover 
clauses part of the initial stock o f fering o f  a new f irm, that 
the o f fer sold implies the mean ing ful consent o f  sha�eholders to 
the clauses; for potential buyers have a wide choice o f  
investment vehicles a n d  presumably chose the particular f irm 
because it was the best option . But when antitakeover ame n dments 
are proposed by the managers o f  an o ngoing company with widely 
dispersed shareholders, their adoption cannot support an 
implication o f  mean ing ful consent in the same way. Coordination 
costs among shareholders may prevent e f fective opposition to the 
managers. 42 
These con sideration s  can not alon e  support a conclusion that 
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antitakeover amendments should be held unen forceable . As a 
contervailing argument, if the amendments are s l g n i f  icantly 
disadva�taging to target shareholde rs en ough of them may sell to 
reduce su f f iciently the advantages to the man agers of proposing 
such clauses. That is , the market perhaps could discipline the 
managers . 43 Also, when a tender o f fer is made, target 
shareholders may prefer certain kinds o f  antitakeover clauses to 
be en forced for the same reason that they then pre fer auctions; 
the clauses may increase the price paid for their stock. Whether 
a third party tender o f feror can raise contract law objections to 
de feat the target shareholders' true �� consent to the 
amended corporate form ls a dif ficult question . Nevertheless, 
these objectio ns seem su f f icie ntly serious to suggest the 
importance o f  analyzing from a contract law viewpoint the 
le gality o f  the many recent corporate structure changes that 
reduce the likelihood of success ful takeovers. 
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F O O TNO TES 
Maurice Jones, Jr. Professor of Law, U. S. C. Law Center; 
Professor of Law and Social Science, California Institute of 
Technology. I am grateful to Jeff Strnad ' for extremely 
helpful suggestions. Richard Craswell, Michael Levine and 
Matthew Spitzer made useful comments on an earlier version of 
the model set out in Part IA, infra. 
1. See MacDonald, New D irections in the Economic Theory of 
Agency, 17 Canadian J ,  Econ . 415 (1984) (reviews agency 
literature); Rees, The Theory of Principal and Agent: Part I,
Discussion Paper 0 627, Kellogg School of Management, 
Northwestern University (1984) (same) , The agency literature 
shows that if: (i) agents - the managers - are risk averse; 
(ii) principals - the shareholders - cannot observe the 
agents' efforts; (iii) the output to which the principals 
have a claim is a joint function of the agents ' efforts and a 
state of nature that has a stochastic realization; (iv) the 
principals also cannot ob serve the state of nature; but (v) 
the principals can observe output, then the agents have an 
incentive to produce less than the principals would regard as 
optimal and there is no compensation rule for agents, 
conditioned only on output, that will ensure optimal agent 
behavior. The difference between how well managers actually 
do and how well they would do were they to act optimally is 
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called the "agency cost" of the corporate form. 
2 ,  The b est statement of this view is Gilson, A Structural 
Approach to Corporations : The Case Against Defensive Tactics 
in Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819 (1981). Most 
defensive tactics are legal, however. See, �· Panter v. 
Marshall Fields & Co. , 646 F. 2d 27 1 (7th Cir. 1981). 
3 , These requirements are set out in Sections 13 and 1 4 of the 
Williams Act, and in S E C  Regulation 14E, 17 C. P. R. � 240. 14e­
( 1980). 
4 , See Easterbrook and Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in 
Tender Offers, 3 5  Stan . L. Rev. 1 (1982); .!.!!_., The Proper 
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender 
Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev . 1161, 1175-80 (1981). 
5. The leading academic proponents of the claims about to be
summarized are Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing 
Tender Offers: A Reply and E xtension, 3 5 Stan . L .  Rev . 23 
(1982); .!.!!_. ,  The Case for Facilitating Tender O ffers, 95 
Harv. L. Rev . 1028 (1982); Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids 
Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 Stan. L.
Rev . 51 (1982); Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood In Hostile 
Takeovers: A Proposal For Legislation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 249 
(1983); see also Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate 
Control: A Critical A s sessment of the Tender Offer's Role In 
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Corporate Governance , 84 Colum. L. Rev. 114 5  ( 1984) 
( consi ders auct i ons w i th i n  a broad analys i s  of corporate 
governance i ssues , and argues that the role of markets for 
corporate control in d i sc i pl i n i ng managers ls overstated). 
6. The model is wr i tten in narrati ve form. Important and
possi bly controvers i al factual statements are i dent i f ied �y
such phrases as " suppose that " or "I assume. " 
The condi t i ons under wh i ch markets for contract terms w ill 
behave compet i t i vely are explored i n  Schwartz and W i lde , 
Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warrant i es and 
Secur i ty Interests , 6 9 Va. L. Rev , 13 87 ( 1 983) . 
8. In the econom i cs of informat i on a "search good" 1s one all of 
whose propert i es are observable before purchase. An 
"exper ience good" i s  one whose propert i es cannot be observed 
except i n  use. A contract is a search good because a buyer 
or investor can read i t  before agree i ng to a deal; automob i le 
seat comfort i s  an exper i ence good because one must buy the 
car to observe fully the attr i bute comfort. Goods can have 
both search and exper i ence aspects �. appearance and 
dura b i l i ty .
9. Grossman and Hart , i n  a very i nterest ing paper , char.acter i ze 
f i rm and manager behav i or roughly s i m i larly to the way the 
model w i ll do below , but they do not cons ider search for 
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m i smanaged f i rms nor do they character i ze in deta il the 
managers' ut i l i ty functi ons . See Grossman _and Hart , Takeover 
B i ds ,  the Free - R ider Problem , and the Theory of the 
Corporat i on ,  1 1  Bell J .  E con . 4 2 ,  4 7 - 50 ( 1 980). 
10,  The sem i -strong form of the eff i c i ent market hypothes i s  holds 
that share pr i ces reflect all publ i cally ava i lable 
i nformati on about a company. An i mpl i cat i on of the 
hypothes i s ,  for example , i s  that an investor could not earn 
pos i t i ve returns by p i ck i ng stocks on the bas i s  of annual 
reports; that i nformat i on i s  already reflected in share 
pr i ces ,  Pos i t i ve returns can be earned by tradi ng on i ns i der 
i nformat i on ,  however. 
11. The determ i nants of the prem i um requ i s i te to i nduce 
shareholders to tender are thoughtfully explored i n  Grossman 
and Hart , The Allocat i onal Rule of Takeover Bids i n
S i tuat i ons o f  Asymmetr ic Informat i on , 3 6 J .  F i n. 253 
( 1981 ). It is necessary to assume here only that such a 
prem ium ex i sts and that potent i al acquirers can know what i t
l s .  These assumpti ons seem cons i stent w i th the frequent use 
of tender offers. 
12. The easi est way to proceed i s  to suppose that a manager i s  caught 
i n  the per i od ( i- 1  ) ,  Then let s *- • A r and � r 
( s  - s) - -------- • B. 
r ( 1+r) i - l 
Let r > 0 and s i gn ( A  - B). Collect i ng terms , ( A  - B) s s i gn 
[ (1 + r) i - l ( s* - ii )  + s - a )  J .  Because s *  -
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s < 0 , s - s > O and 3 - s > \s * - ;f here exi sts an r 1 a r g e 
enough such that s i gn < O ,  and there exi sts an r small enough 
such that s i gn > O. Also A-B decreases monoton i cally w i th 
increases i n  r. The goal is to s i g n the d i fference between 
(1 ) and (2) above, but 
"' i -1 (1 )- (2) • i� 1 c 1 -x >  x C A - B) i 
] large enough r s. t .  ( 1 )- (2) < 0  
3 small enough r s. t. (1 )- (2) > 0. 
And ( 1 )- (2) decreases monoton i cally w i th i ncreases i n  r. 
1 3 . A golden parachute contract, made between manager and f i rm, 
prov i des the manager w i th a large sum in the event of job 
loss from takeover . These contracts have defenders . Some 
cla i m  they help cause managers not to oppose takeovers. See 
Charney, S hareholder Coord inat i on Costs, Shark-Repellents and 
Takeout Mergers: The Case Aga i nst F i duc i ary Dut i es, 1 9 83 ABF 
Res . J .  3 41 , 3 83 at note 1 9 7 . G i ven these contracts' 
negat i ve i ncent i ve effects, i t  seemi ngly i s  preferable just 
to allow acqu irers to buy manager consent � �· Golden 
parachute contracts also may reduce manager uncertai nty 
because they i nsure managers aga i nst be i ng f i red after 
"m i staken " takeovers, those mot i vated by false acqu i rer 
bel i efs that mana gers were fa i l i n g  to max i m i ze .  Such 
i nsurance may help f i rms to attract good managers . Th i s  
poss i ble just i f i cation for g olden parachute contracts i s  
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outs i de the scope of the formal analys i s ,  which supposed 
acqu irers to b i d  only when they should, but it also seems 
unpursuas i ve. The best way to approach the i ssue ls to ask 
whether potent ial i nvestors would regard golden parachute 
contracts as desirable when they dec i de whether to buy a 
f i rm's shares . Intu i t i on sug gests not. An acqu irer would 
make a tender offer (a) to explo it synergy; (b) for 
i nvestment; (c) to cure m i smanagement; or (d) i n  the m i staken 
bel i ef that m i smanagement occurred. Managers are unli kely to 
be f i red in cases (a) and (b), and w ill be f i red in case (d) 
only if acquirers routi nely fa i l  to learn the facts i n  
t i me .  In case (c), managers are f ired w i th certa i nty, but 
they can prevent case (c) from ar i s i n g .  S i nce target 
managers have i ncent i ves to reveal the true facts to 
acqu irers in case (d), both before and after a takeover, and 
the market d i sc i pl i nes acqu irers that rout i nely make 
m i stakes, the l i kel ihood that managers w ill suffer wrongful 
job loss seems low . If so, the i nsurance aspects of golden 
parachute contracts would not be espec i ally i mportant to 
managers when choos i ng jobs , Hence, rat i onal investors 
probably would decide that the pos i t i ve aspect of these 
contracts, in attract i n g  better mana gers, would be outwe i g hed 
by the ir negat i ve aspect, in reduc ing the i ncent i ve of 
managers to max i m i ze. Further, the agency l i terature seems 
unan i mous in assu m i n g  that contracts wh i ch cond i t i on manager 
rewards on the ir own or corporate output offer the best 
chance of i nduc i n g  opt i mal manager behav ior . See author i t i es 
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c i t e d  s u p r a  no t e  1 .  T h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t g o l d e n  p ar a c h u t e
c o n t r a c t s  s ho u l d  b e  b a n n e d  t h u s  s e e m s  s o u n d , t h o u g h  m o r e  w o r k  
o n  t h e  i s s u e  w o u l d  o b v i o u s l y b e  h e l p f u l .  !" o r  a v i e w  t h a t
t a k e o v e r s  s e r i o u s l y  th r e a t e n t a r g e t  m a n a g e r s  w i t h wro n g f u l  
j ob l o s s , s e e C o f f e e , s u p r a  n o t e  5 ,  a t  123 q - 3 8. 
1 q .  D r a w s  a r e  a s s u m e d  to b e  m a d e  w i t h r e p l a c e m e n t .  Th i s
a s s u m p t i o n  d o e s  n o t a f f e c t  t h e  r e s u l t s  i f  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  f i r m s 
i n  N i s  l a r g e , wh i c h  a c t u a l ly s e e m s t o  b e  t h e  c a s e .  !" o r  
s i m p l i c i t y ,  t h e  a n a l y s i s  a l s o  a s s u m e s  n o  B a ys i a n  u pd a t i n g . 
15 . B e c a u s e  a u c t i o n s  a n d  d e f e n s i v e t a c t i c s  a r e  p r oh i b i t e d  i n  t h i s
c a s e ,  A - 1 a n d  s o  i s  o m i t t e d  f r o m  ( q ) ,
16 . P ar t i c i p a t i n g  i n  an a u c t i o n  i s  i t s e l f  c o s t l y , s o  (5) s h o u l d
h a v e  a t e r m  t o  r e f l e c t th i s  c o s t .  T h e  t e r m  i s  o m i t t e d  f o r  
s i m p l i c i t y b e c a u s e  i ts o m i s s io n  d o e s  n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  r e s u l t s . 
17 . To s a y  t h a t  a n  i n v e s t me n t  ha s z er o  n e t  p r e s e n t  v a l u e  i s  o n l y
t o  s a y  t h a t i t  d o e s  n o t g en e r a t e  a s u p r a c o m p e t i t i v e  r e tu r n . 
!" o r  e x a mp l e ,  i n  e q u i l i b r i u m  a n  i nv e s t o r  co u l d  n o t  p a y  l e s s  
t h a n  $100 t o  e a r n  $10 a y ea r  w h e n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  10%. 
S i m i l ar l y ,  if a t a r g e t  wo u l d  b e  wo r t h p* p e r  s h a r e  w h e n  
c o r r e c t l y  r u n  a n d  e v e r y on e  k n e w  t h i s ,  n o  o n e  c o u l d  b u y  t h e  
t a r ge t  f o r  l e s s  t h a n  p * . R u b a c k  s t u d i e d  a c t u a l  a u c t i o n s  a n d  
c o n c l u d e d  t h a t " t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  o f f e r  p r i c e  e x h a u s t s  t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  ga i ns for u n s u c � e s s f u l  b i d d e r s . " R ub a c k ,  A s s es s i ng 
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E c o n . 14 1, 15 2 ( 19 83 ) .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t a u c t i o n s  b i d t a r g e t
pr i c e s  t o  t r u e  v a l u e s . J a r r e l l  a l s o s h o w s  t h a t  a u c t i o n s  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n c r e a s e  t h e  p r e m i u m s  t h a t s u c c e s s f u l  bj d d e r s  
p a y . S e e  J a r r e l l ,  T h e  We a l th E f f e c t s  o f  L i t i g a t i o n  B y  T a r g e t s : 
Do I n t e r e s t s  D i v e r g e  i n  a M e r g e ? ,  28 J .  L a w  & E c o n . 15 1 ( 19 85 ) .
18. T h e  m o d e l c o u l d  b e  t e s t e d  i n  t h e  l a b o r a t o r y , h o w e v e r . T h e  ge n r e
o f  m o d e l f r o m  wh i c h  i t  h a s  b e e n  d r a w n  p r e d i c ts we l l  i n
l a b o r a t o r y  e x p e r i m e n t s . S e e  Gr e t h e r , S c h wa r t z  a n d  W i l d e ,  
U n c e r t a i n t y  a n d  Shopp i n g  B e ha v i o r : A n  E x p e r i me n t a l  A n a ly s i s , 
s . s .  W o r k i n g  P ap e r  H , C a l i fo r n i �  I ns t i tu t e  o f  T e c h n o l o g y
( 19 84 ) .  A l s o , t h e  mod e l  p r e d i c t F h i g h e r  t ak eo v e r  p r e m i u m s  a n d  a 
l e s s e n e d  f r e q u e n c y  o f  t a k e o v e r s  w h e n  a u c t i o ns a r e  p e rm i t t e d .  
T h e  a d v e n t  o f  t h e  W i l l i a m s  A c t ,  w h i c h  e n c o u r a g e d  a u c t i o n s , s ee m s  
p o s i t i v e l y  c o r r e l a t e d  w t i h  t h e s e  o u t co me s .  S e e  J a r r e l l  a n d  
B r a d le y , T h e  E c o no m i c  E f fe c ts o f  S t a te a n d  l" e d e r a l  R e g u l a t i o n  o f  
C a sh T e n d e r  O f f e r s , 23 J . L .  & E c o n . 3 q 1  ( 19 80 ) . 
19 . s e a r c h  e q u i l i br i um m o d e l s  t h a t  fo rma l l y i n c l u d e  e x p er i e n c e  g o o d s
h a v e  n o t  b e e n  do n e . Se e S ch wa r t z  a n d  W i l d e , I mp e r f e c t  
I n f o r ma t i o n , Monopo l i s t i c  Compe t i t i o n  a n d  P ub l i c  P o l i c y ,  72 
A m e r i c a n  E c o n . R e v .  18 ( 19 82 )  ( r e v i e w i ng s e a r c h  m o d e l s ) . 
20. S e e  B a r o n , A n  A n a l y s i s  o f  P r o po s e d  R u l e s  t o  L i m i t  R e s i s t an c e
t o  T e n d e r  O f f e r s , Wo r k i n g  P ap e r , S t a n f o r d  U n i v e r s i ty 
( 19 82 ) . B a r r o n  i s  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h t h e  r e ac t i o n  o f  t a r g e t
ma n a g e r s  a f t e r � b i d  i s · ma d e . I n  b r i e f ,  h e  s u p p o s e s  a c a s e
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wh e r e  o n l y  t h e  m a n a g e r s  k n ow t h e  t a r g e t ' s  t r u e  v a l u e ,  t h e  
s h a r e h o l d e r s  p l a y  no r o l e ,  t h e  m an a g e r s  c a n d e f e a t  a b i d , b u t  
t h e y  a c t  o n  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s ' b e ha l f  i n  t h a t t h e y  r e s i s t  o n l y  
b i d s  t h a t  f a l l  b e l o w  t h e  t a r ge t ' s  t r u e  v a l u e . T o  u n d e r s t a n d  
h i s  r e s u l t , l e t  E ( g ) b e  t h e  e x p e c t e d  g a i n  t o  a po t e n t i a l  
a cq u i r e r  f r o m  b i d d i n g ,  n b e  t h e  p r o f i t  a b o ve c o s t a n d  a 
com p e t i t i v e  r e t u r n  on i n v e s t me n t  t h a t t h e  b i d d e r  e a r n s  i f  i t s 
b i d  s u c c e e d s  a n d  p b e  t h e  p r ob a b i l i t y t h a t  t h e  b i d  s u c c e e d s  
- - � .  t h a t i t  e q u a l s  o r  e x c e e d s t h e  t a r g e t ' s  t r u e  v a l u e . 
Th e n ,  E ( g )  = p (  n_s_ 0) + (1 - p ) ( O ) . T h e  b i d d e r  g e t s  t h e
c o m p an y  o n l y  i f  i t s b i d e q ua l s  ( n  • 0 )  o r  e x c e e d s ( n  < 0 )  t h e
t a r g e t ' s  t r u e  v a l u e ;  o t h e r w i s e  no t b e c a u s e  t h e  ma n a g e r s  c a n  
r e s i s t  s u c c e s s f u l l y .  S i n c e  E ( g )  _s_ O ,  p o t e n t i a l  b i d d e r s  ha v e  
an i n c e n t i v e  t o  b i d  low o r  d r o p  o u t . T h e r e fo r e ,  t a r g e t s  ha v e  
a l o w e r  v a l u e  i n  t h e  ma r k e t p l a c e  t h a n  t h e y  wo u l d  h a v e  w e r e  
t ar g e t  m a n a g e r s  u n a b l e  t o  r es i s t ,  s o  r e s i s t a n c e  i s  a g a i n s t  
t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s ' i n t e r es t s .  I n  a l a t e r p a p e r , B a r o n  
i n c o r p o r a t e s  t h e  i d e a  t h a t m a n a g e r s  m i g h t  p r e fe r  t o  r e f u s e  
b i d s  n o t  b e c a u s e  t h e y  a r e  t o o  l o w  b u t  t o  r e t a i n  c o n t r o l .  I f  
ma n a g e r s  a r e  a l l o w e d  t h e  p o w e r  t o  r e f u s e ,  B a r o n  a r g u e s , t h e  
v a l u e  o f  t h e  f i r m  w i l l  b e  l o we r e d  e v e n f u r t h e r  b e c a u s e 
m a n a g e r s  w i t h a p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  c o n t r o l  w o u l d  r e f u s e  o f f e r s  a s  
" t o o l o w "  t h a t  m an a g e r s  w i thou t t h e  p r e f e r e n c e  wo u l d  t ak e .  
Co n s eq u e n t l y , t h e  i n c e n t i v e o f  b i d d e r s  t o  d r o p  o u t 
i n c r e a s e s , S e e  B a r o n , T e n d e r  O f f e r s  a n d  M a n a ge m e n t  
R e s i s t a n c e , 38 J ,  F i n .  331 ( 1 983) .  
Co f f e e  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  f i r m s  a r e  e x p e r i e n c e  g o o d s  a n d  
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b i d d e r s  m a k e  m i s t a k e s . I f  a b i d d e r  m u s t  p a y  a h i g h  p r e m i u m , 
he a r g u e s , i t  w i l l  g e n e r a l l y  b i d  w h e n  i t  i s  s u r e - - a n d  l i k e l y  
c o r r e c t - - t h a t  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  w i l l  g e n e r a t e  n e t  g a i n s . 
A u c t i o n s s ho u l d  t h u s  b e  e n c o u r a g e d  b e c a u s e  t h e y  c a u s e  h i g h e r  
p r e m i u m s . S e e  C o f f e e ,  � no t e  5 ,  a t  1 230- 33, T h i s
a r g u me n t  d o e s  n o t  r e s p o n d  t o  B a r o n ' s  p a p e r s  o r  t h e  a r g u m e n t s  
t h e  t e x t  m a k e s  a b o v e . A l s o , ma r k e t s  w i l l  d i s c i p l i n e  
s y s t e m a t i c  b i d d e r  e r r o r ; i t  s e e m s pr e f e r a b l e  t o  r e l y  o n  t h e m  
r a t h e r  t h a n  a u c t i o n s  b e c a u s e  a u c t i o n s  d a m p e n  s e a r ch . 
21 ,  S e e  L e v i n e
2 2 .  S e e  a u th o r i t i e s  c i t e d  s up r a  n o t e  5 ,  
23. S e e  R .  B r e a l y  a n d  s .  M y e r s , P r i n c i p l e s  o f  C o r p o r a t e  F i n a n c e
27 0- 7 1  (1984) ( s u m m a r i z i ng s t u d i e s ) ; G i l s o n  a n d  K r a a c k m a n , 
T h e  M e c h a n i s m s  o f  M a r k e t  E f f i c i e n c y , 7 0  V a . L .  R e v .  549, 551-
52 ( 1 98 4 )  ( s a m e ) . A u s e f u l  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  r e c e n t  a n a l y s e s  o f
a n amo l i e s  i n  e f f i c i e n t  m a r k e t  t h e o r y  i s  G o r d o n  a n d
Ko r n ha u s e r , E f f i c i e n t  M a r k e t s ,  C o s t l y I n fo r m a t i o n , and
S e c u r i t i e s  R e s ea r c h , ma n u s c r i p t  (198 4 ) , 
2 4 . Gr o s s m a n  a n d  H a r t  m a k e  a s i m i l a r  a r g u m e n t . S e e  G r o s s m a n  a n d
H a r t , s u p r a  n o t e  9 ,  a t  258- 61 . S u p p o s e  a l l  f i r m s  a r e  b e i n g
r u n o p t i m a l l y  a n d  a l l  s h a r e h o l d e r s  k n o w  t h i s . T h e n  e a c h  s e t  
o f  s h a r e h o l d e r s  wo u l d  i n f e r  t h a t  a t a k e o v e r  b i d  m u s t  b e  b e l o w
t h e i r  f i r m ' s  t r u e  v a l u e , b e c a u s e  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s  wo u l d  k n o w  
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t h a t  an a c q u i r e r c o u l d  p r o f  i t  f r o m  t a k i n g  o v e r  a n  o p t i ma l l y  
r u n  f i r m  o n l y  i f  i t  p a i d  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  f i r m  w a s  w o r t h . 
Sh a r e ho l d e r s  w h o  k n o w  t h e s e  t h i n g s  - - w h o  h a v e  r a t i o n a l  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  - - wo u l d  r e f u s e  s u c h  b i d s , s o  t h e y  w i l l  n o t  b e  
m a d e . H e n c e , a n  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t a k eo v e r  b i d s  a r e  m a d e  t o  
e x p l o i t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  u n d e r v a l u e d  f i r m s  c o n t r a d i c t s t h e  
a s s u mp t i o n  t h a t s ha r e h o l d e r s  h a v e  r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s . 
T a k e ov e r s  c o u l d  e x i s t ,  i n  Gr o s s m a n  a n d  H a r t ' s  w o r l d , o n l y  i f  
a cq u i r e r s  m a d e  s o m e  b i d s  t o  d i s p l a c e  i n e f f i c i e n t  
m a n a g e me n t . T h e n ,  s h a r e ho l d e r s  c o u l d  n o t  i n f e r  t h a t  a l l  b i d s  
w e r e  b e l o w  t r u e  t a r g e t v a l u e s  a n d  s o  m a y  a c c e p t s o m e  o f  
t he m .  T h e  t e x t ' s  a r g u me n t  a b o v e , i n  c o n t r a s t ,  d o e s  n o t  
s u p p o s e t a r g e t  s h a r e h o l d e r s  t o  h a v e  r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s . 
R a t h e r , i t  c l a i m s  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a co n t r a d i c t i o n  b e t we e n  
s u p p o s i n g t h a t man a g e r s  w a n t t o  m a x i m i z e  s h a r e  v a l u e s  a n d 
t h a t  t a k e o v e r  b i d s  w i l l  b e  m a d e ; a n d  t h i s  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  
fo l lo w s  f r om t h e  a s s u mp t i o n  t h a t b i d d e r s  a n d t h e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
t r a d e r s  who c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  m a r k e t  h a v e  r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o ns 
-- t h a t  b o t h  s e t s  o f  e n t i t i e s  w i l l  d r aw t h e  s a me i n fe r e n c e s  
f r o m  f a c t u a l  d e s cr i p t i o ns o f  t a r ge t s .  
25. S e e  B e b c h u k , T h e  Ca s e  f o r  F a c i l i t a t i n g  C o m p e t i n g  T e n d e r
O f f e r s : A R e p l y  a n d E x t e n s i o n , 35 S t an . L .  R e v .  23, 30-31 
( 1982); G i l s o n , s u p r a  n o t e  5 ,  a t  53-55. B e b c h u k  a l s o
a p p a r e n t l y b e l i e v e s  t h a t  w e r e  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  s e a r ch t o  b e  
i n c r e a s e d  o v e r  p r e s e n t  l e ve l s ,  t h e r e w o u l d  b e  n o  i n cr e a s e  i n  
" b e n e f i c i a l  a cq u i s i t i o n s . "  I d . a t  33, H e  g i v e s  n o  g r o u n d s
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f o r  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t we a r e  i n  t h e  b e s t  o f  a l l p o s s i b l e w o r l d s  
e x c e p t  t h a t  a fa i r  n u m b e r  o f  t e n d e r  o f f e r s  a r e  n ow m a d e .  
Th i s  e v i d e n c e  l s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  
n o n m a x l m i z l n g  e q u i l i b r i a .  
26 . I d . T h e  t e x t  n e x t  r e f e r s  t o  a s e a r c h e r ' s  t w o  c h o i c e s . 
G i l s o n  g i ve s  h i s  s e a r c h e r  t h r e e  b u t  t w o  a r e  u s e d  h e r e  to p u t  
t h e  c a s e  mo s t  f a v o r a b l y  f o r  h i m .  
27 , G i l s o n ' s  e x a mp l e  a l s o c a n  b e  a n a l y z e d  b y  u s i n g t h e  m o d e l  i n
P ar t  I ,  w h i c h  a l lo w e d  a s e a r c h e r  t o  r e s e l l  t o  t h e  a u c t i o n  
w i nn e r . U n l i k e  m y  m o d e l ,  G i l s o n  a s s u me s  n o  u n c e r t a i n t y  a n d  
t h a t  t h e  s e a r ch e r  c a n  b u y  s o m e  s h a r e s  a t  t h e  m a r k e t  p r i c e  
w i t h o u t p a y i ng a p r e m i u m  wh i l e t h e  m o d e l  s u p p o s e d  u n c e r t a i n t y 
an d a s s u m e d  t h a t t h e  s e a� ch e r  h a d  to p a y  a p r e m i u m  f o r  e ve r y  
s h a r e  i t  a c q u i r e d .  W i t h ou t u n c e r t a i n t y ,  G l l s o n ' s  e x a mp l e  i s  
b e s t  a n a l y z e d b y  u s i n g ( 4 )' a n d  (5) ' ,  b u t  a l t e r i n g  t h e m  t o
r e f l e c t  t h e  ab i l i t y o f  a s e a r c h e r  t o  b u y  a s h a r e s  a t  L r a t h e r  
t h a n  L + 0 a n d  s u b t r a c t i n g s e a r ch c o s t s . 
( 4 ) "  ( a  - a ) Z ( p * - ( L + 0 ) ) + a Z ( p * - L )  - c ( n ) 
( 5)" A [ ( a - a ) Z ( p * - p ' ) ]  + a Z ( p * - L )  - c ( n ) . 
R e c a l l  t h a t  ( 4 ) "  r e f l e c t s  t h e  ga i n  to a s e a r c h e r  i f  n o  
a u c t i o n  l s  h e l d  wh i l e  (5)" i n c l u d e s  a u c t i o n s . I n  G i l s o n ' s
e x a mp l e , c ( n )  = $2,500,000, L = $50, 0 = $50, p *  = $1 20, Z = 
o n e  m i l l i o n  sha r e s , a =  1 ( w i t h o u t  a n  a u c t i o n  t h e  s e a r ch e r
b u y s  t h e  wh o l e  c o m p a n y ) ,  a =  . 1 , >. • 1 w i t h o u t  a n  a u c t i o n
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b e c a u s e  no o t h e r  b i d d e r s  a p p e a r ,  � • O w i t h an a u c t i o n
b e ca u s e t h e  s e a r ch e r  c a u s es t h e  a u c t i o n  t o  o c c u r  o n l y  i f  i t
d e c i d e s  n o t  t o  b u y  t h e  c o m p a n y . T h e n  ( Q ) "  - $ 2 2 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
w h i l e  ( 5 ) "  = $ Q , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 . T h e  f o r m a l a n a l y s i s  t h u s  r e a c h e s  
t h e  s a m e  r e s u l t  a s  t h e  t e x t ' s  i n f o r m a l a p p r o a c h : t h e  t e n d e r  
o f fe r  s t r a t e g y w t i h o u t  a n  a u c t i o n  g e n e r a t e s  a n e t  g a i n  o f
$ 1 8 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 , wh i c h p r o f i t  m a x i m i z i ng s e a r c h e r s  wo u l d  n o t  
r e f u s e .  
2 8 . S o m e  f i r m s  s p e c i a l i z e  i n  d i s c o v e r i n g  i n fo r m a t i o n ,  b u y i n g  o r  
s e l l i ng s t o c k  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  th i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  t h e n  
r e l e a s i n g  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  t h e  m a r k e t .  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  
e a r n  po s i t i v e r e tu r n s f r o m  th i s  a c t i v i t y ,  b u t  t h e  a c t i v i t y i s  
i r r e l e v an t t o  t a k eo v e r s .  
2 9 . S e e , �· B e b c h u k , s u p r a  n o t e  2 5  a t  3 9 - Q O ;  G i l s o n , s u p r a  
n o t e  5 ,  a t  6 2 - 6 3 .
3 0 . S e e  B e b c h u k , s u p r a  no t e  2 5 ,  a t  Q 1 - Q 2 ;  G i l s o n , s u p r a  no t e  5 ,
a t  6 3 . A u c t i o n s  m i gh t  h a v e  e f f i c i e n c i e s  w e r e  a u c t i o n  c o s t s  
l o w e r  t h a n  t h e  c o s t  o f  r e s a l e s  f r o m  s u c c e s s f u l  f i r s t  b i d d e r s  
t o  l a t e r , h i g h e r  v a l u i ng u s e r s . A u c t i o n  p r op o n e n t s  d o  n o t  
m a k e t h i s  c l a i m ,  a n d  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  k no w  wh e th e r  t h e  
c l a i m  wo u l d b e  v a l i d ; t h e  r e l e v a n t  c o s t s  a r e  h a r d  t o  
m e a s u r e .  O l i v e r W i l l i a ms o n  b e l i e v e s  t h a t c o r p or a t i o n s  t o d a y  
a r e  o r g an i z e d  i n t o " p r o f i t  c e n t e r s " a n d  m a n a g e d  o n  a 
d e c e n t r a l i z e d  b a s i s .  Th i s  m a k e s  t h e m  e.a s i e r  t o  a cq u i r e t h a n  
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p r e v i o us l y ,  h e  s a y s , b u t  i t  a l s o  s h o u l d  m a k e  n e w  a c q u i s i t i o n s  
r e l a t i v e l y  e a s y  t o  s e l l .  S e e  W i l l i a m s o n , C o r po r a t e 
G o v e r n a n c e , 9 3  Y a l e  L . J .  1 1 9 7 ,  1 2 2 Q - Q 5  ( 1 9 8 Q ) ,
3 1 . E as t e r b r o o k  a n d  F i s h e l  d i s a g r e e  w i t h t h e  c l a i m  b u t  d o  t a k e  i t  
s er i o u s l y . T h e y  s a y  t h e  c l a i m  c a n n o t  b e  e v a l u a t e d  " a t  t h e  
l e v e l  o f  t h e o r y "  a n d  c o n c e d e  t h a t  i f  " m a n a g e r s  • . . p r e f e r 
s i z e  t o  p r o f i t s , t h e  l i k e l i ho o d  o f  r e t r a n s f e r  o f  a s s e t s  w o u l d  
b e  r e d u c e d , "  E a s t e r b r o o k  a n d  F i s h e l , A uc t i o n s  a n d  S u n k  C o s t s  
I n  T e n d e r  O f f e r s , 3 5  S t an .  L .  R e v .  1 ,  1 Q ,  1 5  a t  n . 3 1 
( 1 9 8 2 ) . T h e i r  r es p o n s e  i s  t h a t  m a n a g e r s  p r e f e r  p r o f i t s t o  
s i z e . T h e  t e x t  n e x t  a r g u e s  t h a t  \ h e s i z e  c l a i m  c a n  b e  
e � a l u a t e d  a t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t h e o r y , i f  r a t i o n a l  b e h a v i o r  l s  
a s s u m e d , a n d  t h a t a p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  s i z e d o e s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y 
i mp l y  a r e l u c t a n c e  t o  r e s e l l  a s s e t s . 
3 2 .  I n  a t w o  s t e p  m e r g e r , an a c q u i r e r f i r s t  b u y s  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e 
t a r g e t a n d  t h e n  m e r g e s  t h e  t a r g e t  i n t o  i t s e l f . S h a r e h o l d e r s  
w h o  d o  n o t  t e n d e r  i n  t h e  f i r s t  s t e p  c a n  b e  r e q u i r e d b y  l a w  t o  
s e l l  t he i r  s h a r e s  a t  t h e  s e c o n d  s t e p  - - t h e y  a r e  " f r o z e n  o u t "  
- - a n d  ma y r e c e i v e a p r i c e l ow e r  t ha n  t h e  t e n d e r  o f f e r  
p r i c e . T h e  l a w  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  t h i s  s e n t e n c e  i s  t h o u gh t f u l l y  
s u mm a r i z e d  i n  R .  H a m i l t on ,  C o r p o r a t i on F i n a n c e  C a s e s  a n d  
M a t e r i a l s  5 5 7 - 6 0 Q , 6 2 6 - 5 7  ( 1 9 8 Q ) , S e e  a l s o B u r g m a n  a n d  C o x , 
R e appr a i s i ng t h e  R o l e  o f  t h e  S h a r e ho l d e r  i n  t h e  M o d e r n  P u b l i c  
C o r po r a t i o n : W e i n b e r g e r ' s  P r o c e d u r a l  Appr o a c h  t o  F a i r n e s s  i n  
F r e e z e o u t s , 1 9 8 Q  W i s c . L .  R e v . 5 9 3 . 
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3 3 .  B.eb c h u k , s up r a n o t e  2 5 ,  a t  4 8 ,  
3 4 ,  S e e  t e x t  at p p . 1 7 - 1 8 ,  � ·  
3 5 ,  T h e  l a w  n o w  ma k e s  a l i m i t e d  r e s p o n s e  t o  e q u a l i t y c l a i m s . A n  
a c q u i r e r  w h i c h  w a n t s  t o  p ur c ha s e  l e s s  t h a n  a l l  o f  a t a r g e t ' s
s h a r e s  m u s t  m a k e  a p r o  r a t a  a l l o c a t i o n amo n g  t h e  s h a r e s  t h a t  
ar e t e n d e r e d . S e e  1 5  u . s . c . A .  § 7 8 n ( d ) ( 6 ) .  T h e  S E C
a p p o i n t e d  a n  a d v i s o r y  c o m m i t t e e , c o m p o s e d  l a r g e l y  o f  m e m b e r s  
o f  t h e  b u s i n e s s  c o m m un i t y ,  t o  s t u d y  t a k e o v e r  r e g u l a t i o n . T h e
C o mm i t t e e  R e p o r t  s t a t e d : " A  f u n d a m e n t a l  p r e m i s e  o f  t h e  
C o m m i t t e e ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o ns i s  t h a t  a l l  t a r g e t  c o m p a n y  
s h a r e h o l d e r s  s h o u l d  h a v e  a n  e q u a l  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  
i n  a t e n d e r  o f f e r . "  C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e  C o mm i t t e �  r e c o m m e n d e d  
t h a t  i n i t i a l  b i d s b e  h e l d  o p e n  f o r  a s u f f i c i e n t l y  l o n g  p e r i o d  
s u c h  t h a t  a u c t i o ns c o u l d  b e  c o n d u c t e d ,  S e e  S E C  A d v i s o r y  
C o mm i t t e e  O n  T e n d e r  O f f e r s , E x e c u t i v e  S u m ma r y , a t  x x i i i  
( 1 9 8 3 ) .  P e r h a p s  b e c a u s e  " e q ua l  o p p o r t un i t y "  w a s  a 
" f u n d am e n t a l  p r e m i s e , "  i t s m e a n i n g  a n d  j us t i f i c a t i o n s w e r e  
n o t  e x p l o r e d , 
3 6 .  S e e  R a d i n ,  P r ope r ty a n d  P e r s o n h o o d , 3 4  S t an . L .  R e v . 9 5 7  
( 1 9 8 2 ) . 
3 7 . S e e  Gr e y , P r ope r t y  a n d  N e e d : T h e  W e l f a r e  S t a t e  a n d  T h e o r i e s 
o f  D i s t r i b u t i v e  J u s t i c e , 2 8  S t a n . L .  R e v . 8 7 7  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ; 
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M i c h e l m a n , W e l f a r e  R i g h t s  i n  a C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  D e mo c r a c y , 1 9 7 9
Wa s h . L .  Q ,  6 5 9 . 
3 8 ,  A n o t h e r  wa y  t o  p u t  th i s  p o i n t  i s  t h a t i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
d e f e n d  " p r o c e d u r a l  n o r m s " p e r s u a s i ve l y  w i tho u t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  
t h e  s u b s t a n t i v e  o u t c o m e s t h e  r e l e v a n t  s y s t e m  g e n e r a t e s . 
3 9 , S e e  J ,  R aw l s ,  A T h eo r y  o f  J u s t i c e 8 7 - 88 , 3 0 4  ( 1 9 7 1 ) .
4 0 .  H a r s a n y i ' s v i e w s  a r e  c o n c i s e l y  s e t o u t  a n d  c r i t i c i z e d  i n  D .
M u e l l e r , P u b l i c  C h o i c e  2 4 7 - 5 7  ( 1 9 7 9 ) . 
4 1 . T h e  t e r m  " s h a r k  r e p e l l e n t  a m e n d me n t "  r e fe r s  t o  a v a r i e t y o f  
c h a n g e s  i n  a c o m p a n y ' s  c h a r t e r , b y - l a w s  o r  a r t i c l e s  o f  
i n c o r p or a t i o n  t o  m a k e t a k eo ve r s  mo r e  d i f f i c u l t . T h e y  i n c l u d e  
r e q u i r i ng a s u p e r m a j o r i t y v o t e  ( 7 5 o r  8 0 % ) t o  a p p r o v e  h o s t i l e 
t a k e o v e r  b i d s , s t a g g e r i n g  t e r m s  o f  d i r e c t o r s  so an a c q u i r e r 
c an n o t  r e m o v e  t h e m  a l l  a t  o n c e ,  c o n c e n t r a t i ng v o t i n g p o w e r  i n  
a c l o s e l y  h e l d  c l a ss o f  c ommo n s t o c k  a n d  i s s u i n g  n e w  c l a s s e s 
o f  s t oc k .
4 2 .  G i l s o n  m a k e s  s i m i l a r  p r o c e d u r a l  a r g u me n t s  a g a i n s t  t h e  
e n f o r c e ab i l i t y o f  s h a r k  r e p e l l e n t  a m e n d me n t s .  S e e  G i l s o n ,  
T h e  C a s e  A g a i n s t  Sh a r k  R e p e l l e n t  A m e n d me n t s : S t r u c t u r a l  
L i m i t a t i o n s  O n  t h e  E n a b l i n g  C o n c e p t ,  3 4  S t an . L ,  R e v . 7 7 5  
( 1 9 8 2 ) .  
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43. Th i s  s u gg e s t i o n  h a s  b e e n  p u r s u e d  by a s k i n g  w he t h e r  a f i r m ' s
s t o c k  p r i c e s c o r r e l a t e  p o s i t i v e l y o r  n e g a t i v e l y  w i th i t s 
a d o p t i o n  o f  s h a r k  r e p e l l e n t a m e n d me n t s . O n e  s t u d y  f o u n d
" w e a k , p r e l i m i n a ry s u p p o r t "  f o r  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  m a n a g e r s
p r o p o s e  t h e s e  c l a u s e s  t o  e n t r e n c h  t h e i r  po s i t i o n s ; t h a t  i s ,
s ha r e  p r i c es d r o p p e d  s l i g h t l y . S e e  D e A n g e l o  a n d  R i c e ,
An t i  t a k e o v e r  Am e n d me n t s  a n d  S t o c k h o l d e r  W e a l t h , 11 J .  F i n . 
E c o n . 3 29 ( 19 83 ) .  A n o t h e r  s t u d y  f o u n d  a p o s i t i v e ,  t h o u g h  n o t
s t r o n g , c o r r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  s h a r e  p r i c e s a n d  an t i t a k e o v e r
a m e n d m e n t s , b u t  n o  s u c h  c o r r e l a t i o n  e x i s t e d  f o r  s u p e r ma j 9r i t y 
c l a u s es . S e e  L i n n  & M c Co n n e l l ,  A n  E mp i r i c a l  I n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f
t h e  I mpa c t  o f  " A n t i t ak e o v er A m e n d m e n t s "  o n  C o m m o n  S t o c k
P r  i c e s , i d .  a t  3 61 .  S e e  e s p e c  i·a l l y  p p .  3 7 9-82 a n d  3 84. 
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